Saturday, June 26, 2021

政策研究工作坊 (4月10日&17日)

 



青年民主level up!
政策研究工作坊
我們常説,人民是老闆。
在商業世界裏,老闆會看財務報表或KPI來判斷員工的表現。在一個民主國家,人民可以檢閲政策來監督政府,判斷政府的表現。 沒有政策研究訓練的政客,有時他們信口開河取寵嘩眾,有時很民粹,但身為人民的你懂得批判、指正他們,並能提出更好的替代政策嗎?
But, 公共政策,大至國家憲法小至地方政府指南,似乎複雜且充滿術語,即使想要好好了解,也不知道如何下手,更無從判斷政策的好壞和後果影響是什麼。魔鬼藏在細節裏,為何我只看到小貓咪?
這場公共政策研究工作坊如同哆啦A梦的翻譯年糕,讓你能更容易理解政策研究,並學習技巧自己動手研究,加強問政能力不假手於人,誓要成為比議會廳裡的員工們更為精明的老闆。手持魔法道具道高十丈,讓政界魔鬼賊寇無所遁形。大馬新學聯和群議社將協助你在公民養成之路走得更順暢,邀你一起打造成熟民主的社會。
歡迎各界不分男女老少踴躍報名參與!
政策研究工作坊(入門版)
日期:2021年4月10日(理論班)及17日(實踐課)
時間:下午三點至五點
報名鏈接:https://bit.ly/3dlNUwL
報名費:RM20
聯辦單位:大馬新學聯、群議社
導師: 林志翰博士
林志翰博士是一名資深的政策研究員,目前擔任第三世界网络(Third World Network)高級研究員,之前是檳州研究院(Penang Institute)高級分析員,擅長的研究領域是衛生、政治、經濟、貿易、勞動力、社會福利與保障、房屋、交通與環境。林博士一向來積極參與公共事務。除了是群議社的創辦人之一和各媒體時評人,也曾指導過7場財政預算案研究與分析工作坊,並親身指導不少過10名政策研究實習生。
工作坊學習重點:
1)詢證政策(evidence-based policy)的思考和研究方式
2)搜索數據與資訊
3)分析數據:基本統計概念
4)政策論述:從數字到文字
5)自己動手做:一周政策研究團隊+導師現場點評指導


幻燈片專輯在此:
https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.10101469830846225&type=3

現場錄影在此:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m-Y8_GoEPo4


RTI Teh Tarik Session: Right to Information on vaccination (CIJ, 25-June 2021)

 


Event Introduction text:
Join us in this casual 'Teh Tarik' chat as we will be discussing information gaps, contributing factors to non-disclosure of information, lack of access to information, and what needs to change to ensure a better flow of consistent information to the public.


The Right to Information (RTI) Teh Tarik Series is organised by Centre for Independent Journalism (CIJ).

Online video:
https://www.facebook.com/CIJ.MY/videos/403201480928683


How is the vaccine rollout going at the moment - fast? slow? slow but getting faster? Sivarasa Rasiah says we are slow, but Khairy says we are fast compared to our neighbours like Indonesia, Thailand & Philippines. What's holding it up? Supply issues caused by hoarding by the rich countries? Or are there other factors?

So the question about fast or slow vaccine rollout, we have to first look at the whole global supply chain then only the distribution and vaccine administration speed. The numbers we often compare among countries are the final outcome of all the factors combined. 

We must realise that the vaccine-making machines from manufacturers simply do not recognise or distinguish which country they are producing for. So, on the supply issues, it is mainly in the hands of the small number of manufacturers, depending on the terms and conditions stated in the procurement agreements they striked with many governments and entities. 

From the global data we can see that US and EU countries have received and administered about 320million and 336million doses. Compared to the southeast asia countries with the population size about 85% of EU and US combined, we only received and administered about 10% of their dose amount. There are factors beyond our control, because most vaccine manufacturing capacity is in the West (besides India and China) and the supply does not operate on a ‘first come first served’ basis.

In fact, Indonesia has already received and administered 37million doses, Philippines 8.9million, Thailand 8.1million, they probably received more than Malaysia (Indonesia and Thailand are also contracted to produce vaccines for local consumption). So if unadjusted to population size they are ahead. Singapore had secured the vaccine supply about 2 months ahead of us (most probably due to the premium they paid for Pfizer vaccines), but in terms of total doses, we have received and administered more now. If our government did not diversify the vaccine portfolio and strictly relied on Pfizer and/or AstraZeneca, the problem could be much worse.


How would you rate the flow of information from the government about Covid-19 vaccinations so far?

Let me offer what I think about the regular data information the government has provided for public consumption: only daily and cumulative first dose and second dose administration by state, cumulative registration number by state, as well as number and locations of PPVs.

Only when journalists asked in the press conference or the Minister took the stage of certain webinar, we can know more about other data such as number of vaccine doses arrived and administered by vaccine type, the stats about doses administered by phase, by age group or certain risk group; projection of vaccine arrivals and administration in future. I wonder, why are these information not available and uploaded regularly (although not necessary daily) on the vaksincovid.gov.my website or social media? With enough annotations and explanation about the stats, we do not even need the Minister to explain the data. Instead of letting people speculate and accusing the government this and that without the data, these data information could help leading the public discussion to be more informed and analytic.


 How transparent has spending on Covid-19 been thus far? For e.g. the RM 5 billion withdrawn from KWAN (National Trust Fund) for purchasing vaccines – has there been sufficient information given to the public?

The issue with the public oversight and scrutiny over government budgets has been long standing, passing on from one government to another. Currently there is not much such government budgetary transparent practises in place, besides the PAC (Public Accounts Committee) in Parliament who has the power to summon relevant officers and ministers to offer explanation. But now there is no concrete timeline of when our parliament will be reconvened, and budget oversight should not be left only to PAC, but it is people’s rights (be it voters or taxpayers) to scrutinise such important information, so they can monitor and perhaps offer better advice.

The current practices are whatever budget amount passed and approved in the parliament or under the ordinance now, the government will be able to spend within the ceiling limit, with not much of check and balance. Even the budget line items breakdown when they are proposed is actually far from clear. 

The RM5 billion budget given to fund the PICK programme, we have only one page Lampiran 1 as the reference about the categories of expenditure. How much of these allocated budgets have been spent now? And spent on what? Only the authority knows. 

I’m not suggesting that people would abuse the PICK programme fund, I do not have evidence to say so, and I urge people not to spread lies and fake news if you are not certain or if you are not a whistleblower who knows what is going on. 

Sadly, what happened in the past, many misappropriate public expenditure abuses and scandals were only exposed after our Auditor General did their professional duty checking the quality of works or items purchased against the expenditure claims. However, often this is already too late to save the precious resource lost to corruption.

In fact, many people in the public are still confused and thought that the government is going to spend RM5 billion for purchasing vaccines. No, it is not, only RM3.5billion is allocated for that purpose and logistics cost. Also, now the total dose amount the government ordered has swelled to cover 130% population compared to February’s 110%. However, so far we do not know what are the prices the government would pay for each vaccine in the portfolio, and if the price and dose amount the government orders is justifiable. 

Whether the RM5billion PICK programme fund should come from the National Trust Fund , our own federal reserve or raise debt to cover, I do not have a particularly strong opinion. 



On the subject of vaccine procurement, why are there non-disclosure clauses in our agreements with pharmaceutical companies and what is the impact on our purchase of vaccines and related disclosure of information on use of public funds? (Follow - up question - What can be done to limit the restrictions?

Thanks for this important question. If you ask me if our government has purposely done so and preferred secrecy, I would definitely say ‘NO’. In fact, sadly this is a common global practice, since the demand is so great in the beginning of the vaccine chase race. the pharmaceutical companies have the uneven power and leverage due to legal monopoly of the technology, they can decide who and how many and how fast they want to supply, given the limit of their capacity and scarcity of vaccines in the world. Very commonly, they would like to practice differential pricing, so that they could charge the desperate and/or rich countries more, without letting these countries negotiators have the price reference information from elsewhere to compare with. Clearly, the bargaining power is not in the hands of governments, especially those from smaller countries like Malaysia, unless you are willing to pay a much higher premium like some countries. 

Besides that, the pharmaceutical companies also want non-indemnity for any health risks that arise from vaccine injections and non-guarantee of delivery timing and volume, so our government cannot use the agreement to make them pay any penalty for delays or failure to deliver.

If you ask me about the impacts of such practises to the public fund, so far it is hard to judge. The allocated budget amount so far for the vaccine procurement and logistics is still reasonable to me, about RM44 per dose. The consequences of public health on the non-indemnity, to me , is a greater issue to me.

The government should reveal the agreement or the important information from the agreement such as vaccine pricing, to the public after a certain period, say 1 year later. For now, at the very least, the government should take the liberty and consider releasing the redacted version of the agreement , as this is possible and have been done in many other countries.






當代系列講座02 - 可否因人而疫 (6月18日)

 


题目 :可否因人而“疫”
日期 :6月18日(星期五)
时间 :8:00pm-9:30pm
主讲人:林志翰(感染生物学博士)
主持人:潘永强(林连玉基金副主席)
媒介 :ZOOM+脸书直播
主办单位:林连玉基金、当代评论
主讲人简介:林志翰毕业于德国汉诺威医学院,是一名感染生物学博士,长期研究公共医疗卫生政策。
讲座简介:疫苗施打是防疫重要的一环。近期阿斯利康(AstraZeneca)疫苗开放申请后,人民纷纷抢着注册。AZ受欢迎的原因是它的效用抑或疫情趋严所致,人民“选无所选”?疫苗政策上,政府宣布从让民众自行选择,后来改为不让民众“选疫苗”。此政策的推行利弊何在?民众可选或不可选疫苗,会否影响接种速度?政府推行疫苗施打面临怎样的挑战?民众又应如何配合?主讲人将为我们分析讲解,疫苗接种选择能因人而异吗


現場錄影:
https://www.facebook.com/Contemporaryreview/videos/1440364126314759

幻燈片專輯:
https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?vanity=cheehan&set=a.10101491236793535




Saturday, June 12, 2021

8度空間華語新聞訪問-6月12日 - 疫情走勢和延長全國封鎖令


1) 延长有必要吗?

有必要延长。如果你看全國159個縣市過去14天的社區感染情況,全國就只有一個綠區,那是在沙巴內陸Beluran。半島只有一個黃區,那是柔佛的豐盛港。昨天的新增病例是6849宗,這些數字是在今年5月之前從沒看過的。這代表社區傳染情況依然很嚴重,每個州和相當多縣市都有新增病例。

我明白有些人會感到鬆了一口氣,因為看到每日新增病例並沒有如早前坊間推測將會破萬。確實,昨天的R基本感染數已下降至0.92,意味著疫情受到控制和好轉,活躍病例也正下降當中,代表衛生部的醫療護理負擔稍微減輕。我們還得關注的是活躍感染群和加護病房病人數目目前還沒停止上漲。

我認為政府要延長多兩周的決定,是要確保目前仍然嚴重的疫情數字可以持續走下坡到一個較可以控制和應付的水平,不然這兩個星期的全面封鎖就前功盡廢了。


2)目前哪些政策您觉得最奏效?哪些可以改进或多此一举?

早期的行管令3.0和現在的全面封鎖政策能進一步減少人民外出互相接觸的機會,這些都證明可以奏效,畢竟那是顯而易見的道理和邏輯,但這些措施並不能長久使用。

目前疫情依然嚴重,所以跨縣跨州禁令依舊需要;政府要仔細考慮哪些行業接下來可以開放,又如何能制止工作簇群;政府可以先考慮為疫情相當受控制和好轉的地區先解封,雖然目前的選項不多。最重要的是政府應該加快疫苗接種的步伐特別是在疫情嚴重的地區,如果貨源充足的話。


3)依据疫情数据走势,您觉得疫情走向乐观?有人说检测量是关键,怕不成正比。预计还需封锁多久才能真正带来”效果”?

政府需要增加篩檢數量,但必須是針對性的篩檢,比如通過追蹤病例或在高傳染風險社區。目前的新增病例數目,根據我的研究分析,並不一定跟隨著篩檢數量增減的方向,如果你堅持用這個邏輯,你大概只有50-50的機會猜對而已。所以我說,大家不應該太注重篩檢的數量而是質量。當然如果政府能提高篩檢數量在針對性的地方的話,就很ok了。


4)疫苗接种”秩序乱”?

目前的疫苗接種計劃正如火如荼進行當中,前天的單日接種劑量有大約15萬8千劑。目前的國家免疫計劃也是處於第二和第三階段當中。政府面對的問題是樂齡人士和高危病人士的登記率不高,即使安排了預約,有些也不踴躍出席接種。當然問題有很多,政府需要去看待和解決。一些地方的疫苗接種中心因為第二階段人士出席人數不理想,而臨時需要找第三階段的年輕人接替,這個情況也不太理想。或許政府應考慮給予更多疫苗接種機會給年輕人,提早安排他們接種,即使最後可能出現預約爆滿的情況,政府可以優先給樂齡人士,至少這樣的安排對所有人不會太倉促。

988《時事一百度》2021年6月11日點評


 



1. 国家元首召见朝野各党领袖 - 为何是此时此刻? 如果你選擇相信馬哈迪的故事的話,他昨天就告訴我們說他曾跟公正黨主席安華通電討論了國家大事,由於安華不懂該做什麼,也沒有提出解決方案,所以他建議致函給國家元首。他說,他過後致函尋求覲見最高元首,解釋為何如今陛下召見各黨領袖。 好了,你相信這故事就這麼簡單嗎?我在這裡做評論的,不是幫人說故事。 最高元首如果只是要解決國家大事,而他的政府又可以勝任,何必召見那麼多人特別是在野黨領袖,就首相和內閣成員即可。但我想,雖然我國是君主立憲制,最高元首本應超然不插手一般政務和政黨政治,但在政治亂世、疫情危機未過去、經濟深受打擊的同時,他可以找到理由主導大局和政治走勢。 我推測,目前有兩個情況給元首增添壓力而需採取行動: (一)一月時頒布的緊急狀態就要在8月1日屆滿了,目前還有少過2個月的時間來決定:是否還要延長或終止。其決定性的兩大因素是 1)要端視疫情是否已好轉至可控制的地步, 2)政治是否能穩定,如果國會要召開,慕尤丁政府會被倒台然後被迫提早舉行大選嗎?自然這個選項是一般民眾目前不要的,從疫情控制的角度也亦然,要得民心的最高元首會不知道嗎? (二)民間各界、社運份子、在野黨、甚至執政聯盟的成員包括巫統議員也一直呼籲和施壓政府和最高元首允許重開國會,大概你們也常看到新聞文告和請願書此起彼落。尤其是當疫情失控和經濟雪上加霜,並沒有在緊急狀態的情況下變更好轉,民間似乎已判斷這個政府已失敗、失靈了,需要召開國會來監督和咨詢政府政策。 事實上,在首相的勸告下,確實國會可以在緊急狀態下召開。那麼,目前來說慕尤丁看來沒有召開國會的意思,最高元首若要能成事就得自己介入拉攏,同時召開國會後也要確保沒有倒閣事件和混亂政局出現在人民面前。因此他召見在野黨領袖們是合理的。 - 有可能会换政府或出现传言中的“联合政府”? 或许現在的局面會讓人民想象去年喜來登行動後,最高元首對各個議員的“面試”-- 這是不是換政府的前奏?特別是元首召見政黨領袖的次序令人另有遐想:怎麼在首相後竟然是主要的在野黨領袖安華、林冠英和末沙佈,隔天才輪到執政聯盟的伊斯蘭黨Tuan Ibrahim和馬華總會長魏家祥,馬哈迪和沙菲宜,然後再多一天才輪到巫統主席末扎希? 我想,在緊急狀態之下,通過皇室插手背後敲定的新政府,如果是真的,肯定缺乏民主正當性,也不見得會比現在的狀況更穩定。元首何必要這樣做呢? 說到一些人推崇“聯合政府”為所謂的解決方案其實更糟糕 -- 想象一下,這個大聯合政府在官職和各政黨利益之間如何分配,首相能如何駕馭這樣的大政府?更何況現在的政府我們的首相已看起來不能完全話事做主了。 所以我否定類似的可能,傾向認為元首更可能向主要的在野黨領袖告誡,要求他們停火盡量配合他的政府度過國家難關落實政策抗疫和復甦經濟,不要一直對政府開火添加麻煩。 從在野黨領袖覲見元首後的口供都一致透露說他們在會談中沒有提及‘換政府’這件事,我們要從中看得出端倪。 - 国会有机会重开吗? 若所有的朝野政黨領袖都同意最高元首可能在會談裡開出的條件,比如說不倒他的政府為首要停火條件,這才會增添在緊急狀態之下重開國會的可能。 在這之前各朝野政黨各懷鬼胎,磨刀霍霍,勢必要不惜代價趁機把搖搖欲墜的慕尤丁拉下來自己取而代之,這些動作怎麼可能元首看不到? 相信這也是為何緊急狀態頒布需加上暫停國會條款的其中一個導火線(其實過去緊急狀態下也可以召開國會)。可能這次需要最高元首調停,國會才有機會重開。 - 在野党领袖都向最高元首提及和要求不再延长紧急状态,你怎么看? 相當有趣,安華說他們都向最高元首建言避免延長緊急狀態,但對此元首的回復很玩味:他說他會遵從君主立憲精神,會根據首相的勸告行事。這意味著什麼?元首把球踢回給慕尤丁。這樣的回答其實也很高明,即沒有反對這建議但屆時就要看整個政局和這些在朝野各黨表現如何了,才選擇接下來如何回應。 - 为何马哈迪要求成立行动理事会?动机何在? 馬哈迪還是馬哈迪,對權位眷念和堅持,95歲了也一樣。這個類似五一三種族衝突後緊急狀態下的國家行動理事會,是一個比起目前臃腫的內閣更為權力集中的10個成員理事會接管政府,肯定是開民主倒車。 提出這個建議的伏筆是什麼? 詢及誰應該領導這個理事會,他就說他自薦來領導(如果政府允許)——哈!你應該聽懂什麼了吧?如果最高元首接納這建議,而領導人仍然是慕尤丁,你認為馬哈迪會同意嗎? 目前的是慕尤丁政府,他會那麼不聰明主動建議把政權交出去嗎?顯然馬哈迪志在製造輿論支持他、貶損慕尤丁。他依然沒有忘記去年喜來登行動後他的敗筆之作——要成為聯合政府的大首相,後來被慕尤丁背叛。如果有行動理事會對馬哈迪來說更妙,才10位成員的理事會,越少牽制他的獨裁獨斷作風當然就越好。


2. 全面封锁奏效,疫情好转了吗? - 每日新增病例在过去几天似乎已走低了,或至少不再飙高,疫情真的已好转了吗? 我們被全國MCO3.0限制了多久?自從5月12日,差不多一個月了。雪隆區大部分的居民還要再早6天。限制了這麼久,一次比一次嚴格,總得看得出一些效果吧? 如果所謂的疫情單單是看感染數字,是的,每日新增病例的最高記錄是在5月29日達9020宗,R值基本感染數最高是在5月23日,那時是1.21。最高的活躍病例記錄是在6月6日,大約8萬6600宗。3天前有誰在高唱5566?應該那天大部分人不太難過。 對照五月未的時候有人會擔心每日新增病例會破萬,確實那個擔憂不是假的,以當時的R值1.16估算確實可以在10天內到達這過萬數字,所以我想首相和衛生部才情急緊急剎車宣佈全國全面封鎖。目前我們看到的疫情走勢局部也反映出行管令3.0的一些效應。我想,全國封鎖還是有助於進一步鞏固疫情感染數字的下滑趨勢。 但如果你看死亡數字或加護病房入住人數,這些數字還正在緩緩上升,但如果新感染病例可以控制下來,死亡和ICU數字應該也會下降,但效果反應會遲緩一周或以上。 另外,新增感染群和活躍感染群的數目到了現在還未顯著停止上漲,職場感染群更是目前是主要的來源。再況且昨天的新增病例數字是5字頭千位,我們感到鬆一口氣因為我們經歷了更糟糕時期的記錄,但這數字依然相當高,尤其是在今年一月之前我們還未見過這個數位的每日新增病例。這表示社區感染依然嚴重,我不認為、也不建議政府大量放寬和開放經濟活動。 - 有人说,这是因为筛检数量不足和减少,所以每日新增病例才会降低,你怎么看? 我知道很多人這麼說,包括在野黨的國會議員。其實這個想法蠻符合一般人的邏輯思維:如果政府篩檢更多人,自然會揪出更多確診人士,數字就不可能走低,反之,如果政府減少篩檢,就可以‘欺詐’玩弄了系統,因為少篩檢怎能找出更多病例? 好的,為了證實這說法是不是真的,那天我觀察和分析了從5月1日到6月8日的兩組數據:每日新增病例和每日篩檢人數的每日變化。我發現,這兩組數據所謂的關聯性correlation是相當薄弱和不顯著的——差不多一半的情況每日新增病例數量跟隨著篩檢人數的增減。這也意味著,另外一半的情況這樣的預測是錯誤的。昨天的兩組數據就是一個好例子,比起前天,昨天篩檢量增加了1萬,但實際上確診數字不增反減少了約570宗! 所以,我們應該要了解有關當局當天的追蹤病例篩檢情況,才能更好地預測走勢,因為確診率與篩檢群體的風險程度相關。 因此,我本身一直不太讚成非針對性的大量篩檢做法和建議,因為那不是妥善運用篩檢資源的方式。 - 什么时候全面封锁应该‘解锁’?政府能如何确保病例不会因重新开放而再飙升? 首相宣佈全國全面封鎖的文告裡有提及不同階段的解封,那是隨著疫情走勢對應經濟和社交領域的開放程度。要解封,我認為政府也應該根據疫情趨勢分析,局部地區應先開放,比如說疫情已相對受控制的縣市和州屬。 如何不因經濟和社交活動重新開放而不增加病毒傳染風險?如果說要制定更嚴格的標準作業程序,那是ok的,但執行上總是會有人不遵從、鬆懈或不小心,這也不能完全杜絕病毒傳染,成效依然會有打折。 我認為抗疫公共衛生政策要奏效,非藥物措施(比如戴口罩、保持人身距離)也需要配合疫苗接種計劃,盡快建立起群體免疫能力,圍堵和減少病毒的擴散和傳播。


3. 加快疫苗接种应考量青少年? - 目前要加快疫苗接种的速度,主要的影响因素是什么?要如何才能快?可以预测何时能达到80%人口疫苗接种覆盖率吗? 首先,要盡快接種疫苗的首要條件是疫苗貨源充足,雖然上個月疫苗接種計劃協調部長凱里誓言旦旦說會有1600萬劑疫苗將在這兩個月抵達,可是前天他透露來自泰國廠的阿斯利康疫苗本應在這個月交貨但確定會延遲。相信還會有不少未知數。 假設貨源不再是問題了,那麼接下來的重要因素便是接種中心數量和負責接種的人手,以及登記預約制度的安排。如果人力資源和物資物流這些都不是問題,政府在全國各大城市設立大型接種中心,那麼疫苗接種速度將能達到一定的速度。 凱里說過從這個月開始每日接種劑量要達15萬劑。最新數據,也就是兩天前6月9日數據顯示,政府有做到。但當中只有11萬劑用來接種第一劑給“新人”。如果說接下來都以這個速度接種,每個月300萬人接種第一劑,那麼到了9月,政府可能就要找新手臂來接種了,因為屆時應該所有登記者都至少接種了一劑,登記率將成為一個瓶頸,政府需要從大型接種中心走入社區。 第4階段疫苗接種計劃會給經濟領域僱員,這可能會惠及不在系統裡的移工群體;第5階段針對青少年就增加了“新手臂”的來源了。 - 为何要达至群体免疫的目标,需要考量青少年? 假設所謂的群體免疫純粹是個數字目標而已,(這當然不是,我等下可以再解說群體免疫的概念),就說政府的目標是要為至少80%全國居民接種疫苗,那麼十八歲以下的人口目前就佔了大約30%,怎樣看政府都必須要向青少年“下手”才在數學上有可能達到80%的目標。 目前只有輝瑞疫苗根據最新的孩童臨床試驗資料申請擴大疫苗接種年齡階層。12至17歲青少年大約佔我國人口的380萬或11.5%。若沒太大意外,國家藥品監管局應該會批准這年齡階層的疫苗接種使用。 12至17歲青少年大約是中學生的年齡,也是目前18歲以下受感染率最高的年齡階層,是社區人口重要的一環,所以把他們納入疫苗接種人口對象有助於圍堵阻斷病毒傳播。 - 要为青少年接种疫苗,需要考虑些什么? 为这个年龄层接种有什么好处? 18歲以下的青少年在我國法律上仍算是孩童,不是成年人。因此要為青少年接種疫苗,那麼就需要成年人同意才可以。所有能在孩童使用的藥物(包括疫苗),必須要有另外一組針對孩童的臨床試驗數據資料支持才能夠獲得各國醫藥局的批准。一般上這些藥品通常會先在成年人階層開始試驗。 12至17歲青少年應被視為小大人了,他們通常也有自己的社交圈子,也可以相當活躍接觸多人。如果說政府希望學校能盡快重開,未來能減少疫情衝擊、斷斷續續開關學校影響孩童的學習和老師的教導,疫苗接種或是一個好策略。 - 这样真的会加快疫苗接种覆盖率吗? 目前輝瑞疫苗全球貨源依然吃緊,以目前的狀況來說,我國比預期在訂單上承諾的交貨數量接獲得少。若只靠這款疫苗才能為12-17歲青少年接種增加疫苗接種覆蓋率的話,貨源絕對是個顧慮。 一旦貨源不再是問題,那麼或許到了9月,如果孩童都可以重返學校,那麼衛生局官員或可以進駐學校一間接一間地為他們大量接種。我希望,屆時衛生局已相對控制好了疫情,然後能挪出更多人手走入社區包括學校接種疫苗。


P/s: 群體免疫是為了提供一個群體疫苗保護作用,防堵或減少病毒傳播。實際上和理論上,接受疫苗的群眾必須要平均分佈,這樣才算有效保護該社區,所以我們不能純粹看疫苗接種數字而已。 假設雪州已有90%人接種了疫苗,那麼就有了群體免疫嗎?如果那數字是如此因為接近100%城市人口接種了疫苗,但郊外的很多村莊或社區完全沒有人接種的話,後者就是病毒的溫床沒有享有群體免疫作用。因此政府必須要鑒定哪裡的居民接種率低,政府需要自己走入社區接種,而不是等人來登記預約安排。


Thursday, June 10, 2021

HOW COVID-19 TESTING AFFECTS OUR DECLINING POSITIVE CASES - BFM interview (9 Jun 2021)

 

With our daily Covid-19 positive cases declining in the past few days, experts have pointed out that testing efforts are also decreasing. We speak to Dr Lim Chee Han to understand this relationship and the importance of testing in our battle against Covid-19.

Produced by: Kelvin Yee

Presented by: Lee Chwi Lynn, Sharmilla Ganesan

Link is here


1. Talk to us about the relationship between the daily case numbers and the number of tests conducted.    

 

Ok, The public’s general logic is that, once we reduce the number of tests conducted,consequently we should expect a lower daily case number, or another way round if we increase a lot more tests, we should expect a higher number of positive cases.   

My observation and analysis based on these two sets of numbers from 1st May up to 8 June yesterday, the result shows that there is a non-significant weak correlation: about 50% of cases you can observe are true about the public perception: the daily case numbers do follow the test number. In other words, another half of the time you could get it wrong if you bet on that to happen.

 

 

2. How does testing aid our fight against the pandemic?

 Testing is absolutely fundamental for disease control management, contact tracing and surveillance purposes. We need to know who needs to be quarantined or isolated , who needs to be put under early treatment , who else we need to contact for tracing where the viruses disseminate. The test results would give the health authority a certainty in deciding the next course of action on how to deal with the Persons under investigation (PUI) and Persons under surveillance (PUS). The government needs that information to manage the spaces for our hospital beds and many quarantine centres as well.

So, it is crucial that we have enough testing capacity and actually test enough for the disease control purpose.

 

3. Why is it important to get an accurate picture when it comes to the case numbers here?

 It is important for the government and our society to know how many are detected positive, so that they could be quarantined away and be treated early for any sign of worsening symptoms. This can prevent the infected persons from going on to cause more disease transmission in the community, as well as saving the persons from severe illness and death.

 

4. What determines our testing numbers? What are some factors that might explain why it drops or rises?

 To answer the question (about what determines the testing numbers), we should understand the circumstances for testing: first, if you are a close contact to a confirmed positive case, a health district officer would ask you to come forward to get the testing done by them. This is via contact tracing effort. Also there are circumstances where one is compelled to do covid testing, such as at the border when arriving from overseas, before surgery operations or emergency procedures and so on. Health officers also may go out and do surveillance testing in the targeted community. These are regular works for the government, probably what is affecting their work rate and output is the number of staff on duty during the weekends and public holidays.

But we also need to look at the contribution from the private labs. Besides the tests which are outsourced by the government, the general public can also voluntarily go use the private covid testing services if one is not categorised as close contact but has high suspicion or concern that himself/herself is infected. In addition, covid-testing campaigns run by the state government or elected representatives could also push up the test number.

The contribution from the private labs is not low: the breakdown data given by the Director General of Health Noor Hisham on 20 May shows that slightly more than half of the total RT-PCR tests came from the private labs. The data also show that private labs command 72% of the testing capacity of the country but that day they only used one-third.

Now I come to offer my explanation about the testing number trend -- one needs to appreciate that the Health Ministry has a cut off time for COVID-19 status daily reporting at 12noon, so whatever numbers finally presented are actually reflecting the situation yesterday’s half day and today’s half day.

From what i can see from 1st of May until yesterday, the weekends and public holidays effect is pretty strong and highly correlated: typically, if you compared the Sunday’s status report to the Saturday’s test number, For example, 6 Jun last sunday we saw a 13.3% reduction compared to preceding day, 30th May we saw a 13.4% reduction in test number. And usually we can also observe further reduction reported on Monday’s status briefing report reflecting on Sunday’s outputs. The only exception to the case is during the Raya Holiday, the significant dip was reported mid-week,( and some went back to work during the weekend.)

Why the weekend effect? If you go check the working hours of the service provided by private labs, most only do half day during the weekend and public holiday, hence you could expect significantly fewer samples contributed from the private labs. Just today the Director General of Health Noor Hisham released a short statement, pointing out that non-health ministry labs may sometimes report the negative test results late, especially during holidays, resulting in lower test numbers.

 

5. And what determines the speed at which those tests are processed?

Procedure-wise, RTK test can give us a very quick result, say the result to be produced in half an hour; for RT-PCR test, if one takes the sample and goes into the lab to perform directly , you should expect the result to be out in 3 hours. But, you know, when things are performed on a large scale and have to organised systematically, that could take a bit longer, but still should be done within 2 hours for RTK and one day for RT-PCR. The result has to be verified and signed off by a pathologist in the health ministry or relevant doctor in the private setting. So, from sample taking, to running the lab procedure to verification and documentation, until reporting to the system and the tested person, one should appreciate it will take some reasonable time for these procedures.

 

6. How much testing is enough?

6a) What are some benchmarks we should be following and achieving?

 

This is a tough question, I don’t think anyone could say that they have a correct answer (on how much testing is enough).

On the benchmark, the statement from our DG Health Noor Hisham today reiterates that WHO set the benchmark of sufficient testing if one positive case is accompanied by at least 10 negative cases and at best 30 negative cases. Currently we pass the minimum threshold but not yet at the best optimum level.

For the disease control purpose, I would argue that the health authority should order as many as reasonable and timely for contact tracing and high risk area surveillance.

But If one’s aim is to catch all asymptomatic cases throughout the country, then how much testing is enough one needs to ask how much is operationally possible for the government and the whole society to pool together to do the mass testing. The limits are the testing accuracy, manpower to perform the sampling and delivery, as well as laboratory testing capacity.

But how often the testing should be done, can the government healthcare facility and workforce cope with the surge of cases? -- one should not think just about the testing, what is more important is the contact tracing work and treatment follow up with the confirmed patients. It will be totally irresponsible if one is tested positive and no one could follow up - I guess you can imagine that.

 

 

7. How can we increase testing?

7a) With public health infrastructure being strained, how can tests done using private services be made more affordable?

 

For your information, at times the government is also outsourcing to the private facilities for testing, since the private labs have the most and significant capacity for testing. I would personally urge the government to do more testing for contact tracing if it is possible to arrange, and do more testing in targeted high risk community surveillance. That should be the direction of increase testing. I hope the government can negotiate better and more affordable deals, at the same time hope the private market competition could drive down the service pricing too for the general public.

Recently there is a RTK product which can be easily used at home, one can just test the kit with your own saliva. Maybe these kind of self-testing can be helpful.

 

8. Have you seen any signs of an exit strategy out of this current MCO?

The current MCO looks like preventing the rising trend of daily new cases in the past few days, though the disease burden in the community is still high at the moment. If the economic sectors and various social sectors have to be open in the near future, if SOP could only be effective to a certain extent, then we need to vaccinate the whole population as soon as possible to achieve herd immunity. Once we pass the 50% mark of the vaccinated population, we can expect the disease transmission to go down and control much easier.








Wednesday, June 09, 2021

People's Health Forum initiated petition to Prime Minister: Stop arresting undocumented migrants (8 Jun 2021)

 


PETISYEN KEPADA PERDANA MENTERI YAB TAN SRI MUHYIDDIN YASSIN: HENTIKAN OPERASI PENANGKAPAN WARGA ASING TANPA DOKUMEN, FOKUS KEPADA MATLAMAT MENGAWAL PENULARAN WABAK COVID-19

Kenyataan akhbar oleh YB Dato’ Seri Hamzah Zainudin, Menteri Dalam Negeri pada 29/5/2021 dan 3/6/2021 telah mewujudkan persepsi di kalangan ramai bahawa kerajaan telah buat keputusan melancarkan rancangan untuk menangkap dan menahan warga asing tanpa dokumen (ataupun pendatang asing tanpa izin (PATI) dalam lingo kerajaan) pada skala besar-besaran dalam masa yang singkat.
Kami dari pelbagai organisasi dan individu yang menandatangani petisyen ini berpendapat bahawa pendekatan menangkap dan menahan warga asing tanpa dokumen pada masa ini akan merumitkan lagi usaha melawan pandemik di kalangan rakyat Malaysia, kerana:
1. Operasi sebegini akan menakutkan kaum pekerja asing sama ada antara mereka yang berdokumen ataupun tidak berdokumen. Malahan, tindakan sedemikian akan menyebabkan mereka menjauhi mana-mana wakil pentadbiran kerajaan. Justeru, ini akan mengalahkan usaha kerajaan untuk mewujudkan imuniti kelompok (herd immunity) di Malaysia. Imuniti kelompok memerlukan penyuntikan vaksin bagi 80% penduduk Malaysia, termasuk komuniti warga asing. Kegagalan mencapai tahap vaksinasi 80% penduduk akan melewatkan pemulihan ekonomi negara dan melanjutkan penderitaan rakyat kita.
2. Ada kemungkinan besar bahawa penangkapan dan penahanan PATI pada masa ini akan menyebabkan kluster-kluster baru Covid 19 di pusat-pusat tahanan imigresen. Ini akan meningkatkan penularan wabak Covid 19 di kalangan PATI dan juga akan menjangkiti pegawai imigresen, anggota polis dan kakitangan mahkamah (yang terlibat dalam pengendalian reman) serta ahli-ahli keluarga mereka. Kebarangkalian ini boleh dan harus dielakkan.
3. Jabatan imigresen tiada kapasiti untuk menangkap dan menghantar balik 2 hingga 3 juta PATI yang berada di Malaysia. Menurut Suhakam, anggaran pada 1 Julai 2020 menunjukkan bahawa pusat-pusat tahanan imigresen yang hanya boleh menanggung 12,530 orang tahanan sahaja telah melebihi kemampuannya dengan dipenuhi seramai 15,163 orang tahanan. Selain itu, lebih daripada 95% orang PATI sedang bekerja dan menyumbang kepada ekonomi negara. Bahkan, aktiviti ekonomi negara kita juga memerlukan perkhidmatan mereka.
Mungkin YB Dato’ Seri Hamzah Zainudin percaya ketegasan beliau dalam hal ini akan membantu dalam mengatasi masalah wabak Covid-19. Tetapi beliau harus mengingati bahawa setiap pelan tindakan yang diambil mestilah berasaskan analisa saintifik yang jelas, objektif dan munasabah. Pada masa ini pendekatan menangkap dan menahan PATI akan memudaratkan usaha kerajaan mengawal penularan wabak Covid-19 di negara kita.
Kami amat berharap YAB akan membawa isu ini ke persidangan Majlis Keselamatan Negara supaya satu pendekatan yang lebih sesuai dan bersepadu dapat digubal bagi pengendalian warga asing tanpa dokumen semasa wabak Covid-19 merebak. Pada ketika ini, kita harus fokus kepada matlamat mengawal penularan wabak Covid-19 di negara kita. Matlamat-matlamat lain adalah sekunder dan harus ditangguhkan jika ia bercanggah dengan matlamat utama iaitu mengawal dan mengatasi penularan wabak Covid-19.
Terima kasih.
Yang benar,

致首相慕尤丁的请愿书:停止逮捕无证移民的行动,专注于控制疫情蔓延的政策目标
内政部长韩沙再努丁在今年5月29日和6月3日的新闻声明中已塑造了一个公众印象,表示政府已决定在短时期内发动一个大型逮捕及扣留无证移民的计划。
我们来自各个团体组织及个人签署这个请愿书认为逮捕与扣留无证移民的做法在这时候将为难和复杂化民间抗疫行动,原因如下:
1. 如此的逮捕行动将吓跑外籍移工,不管他们有证或无证。此外,如此的行动将导致他们尽可能远离任何的政府官员代表。这将挫败了政府致力在我国打造群体免疫的努力。群体免疫需要至少有80%以上的大马居民接种疫苗,这包括外籍社群。无法达至80%居民接种疫苗率将延迟国家经济复苏及延长人民受苦期。
2. 逮捕拘留无证移民的行动极可能将爆发更多源自于移民局扣留所的新冠肺炎感染簇群。这将提高无证移民之间的疾病传染风险,同时也可能感染移民厅官员、警察及(处理扣押过程的)法庭职员还有他们的家庭成员们。这些风险机会本应可避免。
3. 移民局没有能力逮捕和遣返2至3百万的居留在我国的无证移民。根据人权委员会的数据显示,2020年7月1日移民局拘留所总合仅能承担1万2530人,但当时早已超出这限制,拘留了多达1万5163人。除此之外,超过95%的无证移民付出劳力贡献给国家经济。再说,我国经济活动也非常需要他们的服务。
或许内政部长韩沙再努丁相信他在此事的强硬态度有助于解决新冠肺炎疫情问题。但是他必须要了解,任何要采取的行动和计划必须基于清晰、客观和合理的科学分析。在此时,逮捕和扣留无证移民将打击政府控制我国疫情新冠病毒传播的努力。
我们非常希望首相您能把这课题带上国家安全理事会会议讨论,确保能拟定出一个更合适及全面的措施处理新冠疫情蔓延时期的无证移民课题。以目前的状况来说,政府应该专注于控制我国疫情蔓延为主要政策目标。其他的目标都是次要的、应该展延,特别是如果其措施与首要目标相冲。请停止逮捕和扣留无证移民。
谢谢。

Ditandatangani oleh:
Organisasi:
1. People’s Health Forum (Forum Kesihatan Rakyat)
2. Citizens’ Health Initiative
3. Agora Society Malaysia
4. Third World Network
5. Health Equity Initiatives
6. Parti Sosialis Malaysia
7. Aliran
8. All Women’s Action Society (AWAM)
9. Alternatives to Violence Project (AVP Malaysia)
10. ALTSEAN-Burma
11. Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM)
12. Archdiocesan Human Development Commission (AHDC)
13. Asylum Access Malaysia
14. Beyond Borders Malaysia
15. Centre for Independent Journalism (CIJ)
16. Citizens Against Enforced Disappearances (CAGED)
17. Consumers Association of Penang (CAP)
18. Demokrat Kebangsaan
19. Dewan Perhimpunan China Kuala Lumpur dan Selangor (KLSCAH)
20. Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Gabungan Serikat Buruh Indonesia (DPP GSBI)
21. ENGAGE
22. Family Frontiers
23. Forum Ekonomi Manusiawi
24. Fugee
25. G25 Malaysia
26. GERAK
27. Geutanyoe Foundation
28. Humanity Heroes Foundation
29. IMAN Research
30. In Between Cultura
31. Institute for Leadership and Development Studies
32. International Women's Rights Action Watch Asia Pacific
33. Islamic Renaissance Front
34. Jaringan kampung Orang Asli Semenanjung Malaysia
35. Jaringan Rakyat Tertindas (JERIT)
36. Koalisi Buruh Migran Berdaulat
37. Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Bina Karya Utama (LBH-BKU)
38. Liga Rakyat Demokratik
39. LLG Cultural Development Centre
40. Mahasiswa Amanah Nasional
41. Mahasiswa Keadilan Malaysia
42. Majlis Kebajikan Kanak-kanak Malaysia (MKKM)
43. Malaysia Hindu Sangam
44. Malaysian CARE
45. Malaysian Health Coalition
46. Malaysian Medical Association (MMA)
47. Malaysian United Democratic Alliance (MUDA)
48. Migrant Workers Right to Redress Coalition
49. Monitoring Sustainability of Globalisation
50. Muslim Professionals Forum
51. MyPJ
52. New Student Movement Alliance of Malaysia (NESA)
53. North South Initiative
54. Our Journey
55. PACOS Trust
56. Pemuda Sosialis
57. People Like Us Support Ourselves (PLUsos)
58. Persatuan Kebajikan Anak Anak Miskin Sabah
59. Persatuan Kebajikan Biji Sawi (Mustard Seed Soup Kitchen)
60. Persatuan Kebajikan Komuniti Dan Dialog
61. Persatuan Sahabat Wanita Selangor
62. Pertubuhan IKRAM Malaysia
63. Pertubuhan Jaringan Orang Asli Johor (JPOAJ)
64. PeSAWAH
65. Prison Fellowship Malaysia Sabah
66. Projek Wawasan Rakyat (POWR)
67. Pusat Komas
68. Refuge For The Refugees
69. Sabah Reform Initiative (SARI)
70. Sahabat Alam Malaysia
71. Saya Anak Bangsa Malaysia (SABM)
72. Serikat Buruh Migran Indonesia (SBMI) Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT)
73. Sisters in Islam
74. Stairway to Hope
75. Student Progressive Front UUM
76. Student Unity Front UKM
77. Suara Rakyat Malaysia (SUARAM)
78. Tenaganita
79. Tindak Malaysia
80. Titular Roman Catholic Archbishop of KL (TRCAKL)
81. Together Against Cancer (TAC)
82. UMANY
Individu:
1. Abu Mufakhir
2. Ahmad Kamal
3. Ananti Rajasingam
4. Andrew Khoo
5. Anthony David
6. Arief Subhan
7. Arutchelvan
8. Bernice Ho
9. Bin Rites
10. Celine Khoo
11. Charles Bertille
12. Cikgu Mohd Azmi b Abdul Hamid
13. CR Selva
14. Dato' Dr Amar-Singh HSS
15. Dato M. Ramachelvam
16. Dato Noor Aziah Mohd Awal
17. Datuk Ambiga Sreenevasan
18. Datuk Dr Anwar Fazal
19. Datuk Dr Toh Kin Woon
20. Dr Alice Nah
21. Dr Ayesah Uy Abubakar
22. Dr Hartini Zainudin
23. Dr Jeyakumar Devaraj
24. Dr Lee Boon Chye
25. Dr Ryan Chua
26. Elain Lockman
27. Elaine Lau
28. Faisal Tehrani
29. Hamidon Ali
30. Hana Maisurah
31. Heidy Quah Gaik Li
32. Hew Kuen Hin
33. Jarud Romadan
34. Jeremy Kwan
35. K. Jeyaraj
36. Kelvin Soimin
37. Lilian Si
38. Lim Siew Kiau
39. Linda Lumayag
40. Loh Jon Ming
41. LY Phang
42. Lynn Tung
43. M.Pusenthi P.Maniam
44. Mahirah Hanis
45. Mary Shanthi Dairiam
46. Mohd Nadzir bin Mohd Nordin
47. Muhammad Sha'ani bin Abdullah
48. Mui Mei Moon
49. Nazihah Muhamad Noor
50. Ng Peng Wah
51. Nik Elin Zurina Bt Nik Abdul Rashid
52. Ooi Vern Hau
53. Peter Pang
54. Prof Shad Saleem Faruki
55. Pua Lay Peng
56. Ronnie Hii
57. Saha Deva A. Arunasalam
58. Salina Hussein
59. Sangeeta choudhury
60. Sivarajan A
61. Sunita Rajakumar
62. Surina Shukri
63. Teng Pooi Kui
64. Teoh Siang Chin
65. Thamboo Devaraj
66. Veronica Anne Retnam
67. Victoria Ng Yiow Kheng
68. Vizla Kumaresan
69. Yap Heng Lung
70. Zahid Alom
71. Zhen Ling Ong


In Media:
https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/578035
https://www.themalaysianinsight.com/s/320297
https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2021/06/08/detention-of-migrants-will-not-help-covid-19-fight-says-ngo/
https://www.thesundaily.my/local/ops-on-undocumented-migrants-will-complicate-covid-war-pm-told-YK7941573
https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2021/06/696964/petition-pm-stop-crackdown-undocumented-migrants-focus-covid-19
https://www.malaymail.com/news/what-you-think/2021/06/08/petition-to-pm-muhyiddin-stop-the-operations-to-arrest-undocumented-migrant/1980452

https://www.themalaysianinsight.com/bahasa/s/320296
https://www.themalaysianinsight.com/chinese/s/320295
https://www.enanyang.my/%E8%A6%81%E9%97%BB/83%E5%9B%A2%E4%BD%93%E7%AD%89%E8%81%94%E7%BD%B2%E8%AF%B7%E6%84%BF-%E4%BF%83%E5%81%9C%E6%AD%A2%E6%8A%93%E6%97%A0%E8%AF%81%E4%BB%B6%E7%A7%BB%E6%B0%91
https://www.sinarharian.com.my/article/142939/BERITA/Semasa/Operasi-PATI-83-organisasi-tandatangani-petisyen-tidak-setuju

https://www.kinitv.com/bm/berita/106003
https://www.kinitv.com/bm/berita/106011



Tuesday, June 01, 2021

星洲日報採訪(6月1日刊出)

 林志翰:速启动“环形疫苗接种”策略

感染生物学博士兼群议社政策研究员林志翰受访时则建议政府在6月疫苗供应相对稳定充足之际,尽速启动月前提及的“环形疫苗接种”(ring vaccination)策略,为爆发疫情的特定地区和簇群接种冠病疫苗。

“比如,某些地方或社区大幅度地增加冠病病例,通过针对环绕他们(确诊者)的密切接触者、家人进行接种,希望能以这样的防堵式接种法,来建造一堵‘防火墙’,阻止疫情继续扩散。”

他强调,目前疫苗接种的瓶颈是疫苗的供应问题,资源有限的情况下,唯有先为前线人员和高风险群体接种,但从6月起,大马开始会有更稳定及充足的疫苗供应,应考虑采用该“环形疫苗接种”策略。

科学工艺及革新部长凯里在1月接受网媒《CodeBlue》专访时提及“环形疫苗接种”策略,即当某个特定地区或簇群出现大规模感染时,就得优先为特定人群接种疫苗。

组队走入社区扩大范围

当场说服直接接种

若大马从6月起开始获得更稳定及充足的疫苗供应,林志翰也认为,政府应开放疫苗接种标准,包括前往疫情热点并给所有人接种疫苗,特别是在人口密集及疫情严峻的县市或区(mukim),以及增设更多疫苗接种地点,包括启动流动疫苗接种车,以扩大疫苗接种范围。

他表示,疫苗接种团队可以前往疫情热点地区,或邻近热点的社区、住宅或建筑工地,为所有居民接种。

“(疫苗接种团队)可以走入社区,当场说服就直接接种,不一定需要等他们事先登记注册,尤其是针对年长者而言。”

“现在的登记方式只是为了方便妥善的事先安排,但现在疫情已经相当严重,应加紧脚步,采用‘环形疫苗接种’策略,并走入社区。”

“辉瑞疫苗在存储和运输须要极低温度的设备,在分发时要解决冷链运输问题,可能不适合用来社区接种,(疫苗接种团队)可以选择其他更适合的疫苗(来进行流动疫苗接种)。”


全文鏈接在此:https://www.sinchew.com.my/content/content_2486380.html

《群議論點》政府不該讓人民自由選擇疫苗(2021年6月1日)



#群議論點 第16篇,社員林志翰撰文

#林志翰 : 政府不該讓人民自由選擇疫苗

原本政府考慮讓民眾可以 #自由選擇疫苗 品牌接種,昨天部長凱里改口說明政府已擱置這個做法,理由是要增加接種速度,推高接種數量...套他的話“我們有什麼疫苗就給什麼疫苗....如果我們給民眾選項,可能會拖慢進度”。我相信他說的是真的,因為民眾可能會期盼某個疫苗產品的到來而寧願繼續等,結果可能出現供應和需求失調,這可能會有一些後果。

首先,政府預訂的疫苗產品有5個,而訂購數量已確定了,有6670萬劑足以為109.65%人口接種,但是各產品的預訂數量分配也訂好了,比如說輝瑞疫苗,政府預訂了3200萬劑、阿斯利康1280萬劑、科興疫苗1200萬劑。

好,如果說人民可以自由選擇,萬一科興疫苗是最多人要的疫苗品牌而且超過3000萬,該怎麼辦?而輝瑞和阿斯利康疫苗少過預訂的一半有人要,政府已買了,疫苗已送貨抵達我國了,該怎麼辦?多餘的輝瑞和阿斯利康疫苗要捐出去,還是作廢嗎?

再來就是疫苗是 #國安時貨,更多時候不是有錢就能買得到,所以不能擔保和確定在某個時候是否有特定牌子的疫苗產品。萬一全球貨源生產緊張,遲遲不能交貨,那麼民眾豈不是要癡癡地等待?他們的耐性好嗎,可以諒解政府嗎?

有了選擇後,民眾會不會互相數落和比較疫苗品牌的好壞,從而降低人民普遍上對疫苗接種的信心?政府不是一直強調所有經過 #國家藥品監管局 批准通過的都是品質保證?

再來就是疫苗的 #物流安排 問題:假設你想要的疫苗品牌有貨了,但不在你臨近的疫苗接種中心,比如說你住在昔加末,而你需要千里迢迢去到新山接種阿斯利康疫苗,你能接受、會照做嗎?還是你會破口大罵,或願意再等待要求政府轉送來你那裡?通勤運輸物流安排方面這肯定要給政府相當多麻煩,只怕政府不能應付。輝瑞疫苗更需要超低溫冷藏庫和運輸冷藏鏈系統。

如果不能協調好 #需求和供應 ,政府就會很容易浪費珍貴的疫苗資源,然後疫苗接種計劃變得即沒效率又進度慢、技術問題叢生,著急的人民因得不到疫苗而民怨四起,最後豈不是到處不討好,政府何必用石頭砸自己的腳?

 

讲座:疫苗开打,几时轮到我 (2021年5月31日)

 


隆雪华堂《#天下事线上谈》系列
讲座主题:疫苗开打,几时轮到我

日期:5月31日(星期一)
时间:晚上8时30分
直播平台:隆雪华堂脸书、隆雪华堂社会经济委员会脸书

主讲人:
林志翰博士(群议社社员、社会经济委员会委员)
颜少君医生(马来亚大学公共卫生硕士博士、高雄医学大学医学学士)

主持人:张孝仪(社会经济委员会委员)
主办单位:隆雪华堂社经委员会

简介:
近来疫情恶化,几乎每日感染人数节节上升,重症加护病房病人,死亡人数也创新高,导致全国人民人心惶惶,而行管令3.0还没看出抑制疫情的效果。疫苗接种被视为其中一个有效控制疫情的方式,可是如今疫苗接种速度和全国覆盖率仍欠理想。最近阿斯利康疫苗开放两轮给民众自愿登记,反应空前热烈,预约档位横扫而空。这也反映出当下疫苗的需求,特别是来自年轻阶层。

虽然如此,全国疫苗接种计划的登记率进展仍缓慢,而第二阶段的计划下的受惠群体包括乐龄人士和慢性疾病病人却很多正保持观望而没去登记。有的不懂如何登记,也有些后来因各种原因‘爽约’了。

到底国家疫苗接种计划下提供的疫苗足够吗?为何那麽慢?既然阿斯利康疫苗可以让人们自愿选择预约,那麽人民可以自由选择其他疫苗产品和预约日期吗?州政府和私人医疗机构可以自行购买疫苗,然后转卖给付费的人民或公司僱员吗?如此的计划安排可以加速疫苗接种吗?最后,我们真的能达到群体免疫,从此有效地控制疫情


当天现场录影:

https://www.facebook.com/secklscah/videos/475107650420330