Wednesday, October 14, 2020

第三波疫情更嚴重

我接受這個訪談的那個早上,CMCO政策行動消息還未傳出。這證實政府也同意說這次的新一波疫情在某些地方和州屬已逐漸失控。

我明白和同意這次區域性的CMCO,相信一些人會問為何不能再早一些在沙巴和雪隆區落實?

感謝《透視大馬》的記者陳安琪的訪問。

再无进一步措施情况不乐观 专家:疫情比第二波更严重 刊登于14 Oct 2020 

感染生物学博士林志翰告诉《透视大马》,实际上这波疫情比起今年3月份爆发的大城堡宣教集会感染群来的更严重。
“那时候,当局还能掌握出席者有谁,但这次前往沙巴的人何其多,加上封锁时间有点迟,病毒已经扩散至全马了。”
他说,从近日卫生部公布的数据来看,雪兰莪病例排在第二,实在令人担忧。
“雪兰莪人口最密集,又是经济火车头,如果政府不再采取进一步措施的话,民众每天都会听到哪里确诊,情况只会不乐观,病例在短期内也不会下降。”
他指出,政府目前在全国采取针对性地区封锁,实际上治标不治本。
“哪里是红区就封锁哪里,但我认为这不是最有效的。第一,病毒很容易传染,又具有潜伏期,加上大部分患者是无症状确诊,因此根本不知道谁受到感染。”
“如果(确诊病例)达到一个程度之后,政府应该采取渐进式的方法。毕竟传染病毒是靠人带动的,只有减少交流,才能慢慢把疫情控制下来。”
...
“如果经济活动继续流动,大家就会继续走,病毒很容易就扩散。”
他明白政府为了巩固国家经济和确保人民收入而不敢轻举妄动,但是如果病例仍高居不下,显示其方法已经失效。
首相慕尤丁曾于10月6日强调,政府不会再次落实行动限制令(MCO),因为这会搞垮我国经济体系。
对此,林志翰认为,“政府该拿捏好,该下重药的时候就应该下,否则病例一直上升,迟早还是回到全国封锁。”
他建议,政府或可以实施有条件行动限制令(CMCO),将不重要的行业先暂停、允许特定工厂操作以及巴刹购物广场人流多的地方,要有更严厉的管控。
“我相信政府掌握更多数据,知道是否能控制,如果没办法就长痛不如短痛,实施一个有条件封锁的暂缓方法,这对大家都有利。”

亮相阿米頻道

 第一次亮相“阿米”頻道,大談公共衛生和宜居城市。

原來雪州大臣的中文宣傳單位還有把那些提及城市規劃和管理的部分也剪輯起來在他(阿米)的頻道播出。感謝製作團隊把我的想法接近完整地表達出來。


(公共衛生)


(宜居城市)




愛FM《名師早點》:第三波疫情發展- 點評內容(5/10/2020)

名師早點,多知一點。大家好,我是志翰,群議社政策研究員。今天要和大家談談第三波疫情發展。

過去連續4天我國新增病例激增至超過每日250宗,兩天前更創下了單日新高記錄317宗。即使在3月發生了大城堡感染群大傳播事件後,單日新增的最高數字也只去到235。
很多人關心的是,是否現在的疫情比3月時更嚴重?前天國防部高級部長伊斯邁沙比里宣佈暫時不需要執行全國封鎖的行管令,嘗試安撫國人的憂慮。坦白說,如果不是顧忌影響經濟和人民已叫苦連天的生活,相信衛生部或許會更希望能趁這個時候暫時封鎖全國,因為目前第三波疫情的挑戰肯定比3月時更嚴峻。
怎麼說呢?
第一,自9月20日以來,截至昨天從沙巴回來的感染病例數字已達206,而且“遍地開花”擴散到每個州屬和地方。
當中超過半數集中在雪隆區包括佈城。同一時期,從沙巴回來在西馬半島傳播的感染群已有10個。比起早前3月時的主要挑戰和考驗是追蹤大城堡集會的出席者,現在問題是沙巴5大縣市紅色災區包括亞庇、斗湖和仙本那,地廣人多,要追蹤是不可能,所以僅能封鎖和篩檢進出的人口。可是,這些防疫措施極可能已來遲了,因為已有相當多的病毒已傳播到其他沙巴縣市甚至全國各地。
第二,再看一些全國疫情數據。一個月前9月4日,我們僅有165活躍病例,17個縣市在兩周內發現病例;對照昨天,活躍病例已翻了近十倍達1961,同時將近50縣市,也就是三分之一全國縣市過去14天‘中招’。病毒如此火速蔓延傳播,若政府沒祭出什麼新措施控制疫情,恐怕疫情發展會比八月初澳洲維多利亞省的第二波疫情還要糟糕。
為何我會如此說?
第三點至關重要,如今我國主要傳播的新冠病毒是D614G變異病毒,其感染和複製速度和效率遠超於早前在中國武漢的原種。我國的醫療研究中心(IMR)八月時發現,此變異病毒10倍更易傳染給人。如果那個帶病的是超級傳播者就更糟了。這也在某個程度上解釋了為何第三波來得那麼快,同時增加偵查追蹤病源防疫工作的高難度。特別是因為大約85至90%的病患沒有出現症狀,然後感染潛伏期是5天至14天,大家其實真的防不勝防。
事實上,在7月30日沙巴州議會宣佈解散的那一刻,其實沙巴一直都還存有一些社區感染病例。6月和7月加起來的(社區感染)病例達46宗。現在很多人都怪政治人物執意要在那個時候進行州選,害到現在發生第三波疫情。我其實不反對票選民主選舉的需要,問題是各政黨候選人和助選團本身是否有嚴格遵循SOP保持社交距離、不舉行大集會、常洗手和正確地佩戴口罩?我想大家參考沙州競選照片,再對照新加坡大選的情景,心裡就有個譜為何沙巴州選後疫情會變惡化,而錯或許不在選舉本身。
總而言之,這次的第三波疫情不容樂觀。傳說和期待中的疫苗只聞樓梯響不見人下來,現在肯定遠水救不了近火了。大家務必要更有紀律遵守SOP、保持社交距離,及個人的衛生。被指示隔離的人,更要遵守。保護自己,照顧別人,謝謝!

Malaysia’s reservations about vaccine plan may be justified

 

AMID fears of a third wave of the Covid-19 outbreak in Malaysia, many are hoping for a vaccine to appear sooner as the solution, once and for all. This is despite numerous reminders by Health director-general Dr Noor Hisham Abdullah that social distancing and practising good personal hygiene are key to breaking the virus’ chain of transmission, as no vaccines were available to the Health Ministry when it faced SARS and MERS in the past.

Then came pressure from the Malaysian Medical Association and some health-related organisations on the federal government before September 18, the deadline for Malaysia to join the global Covax Covid-19 vaccine access plan (The Covax Facility) and commit financially before October 9. Covax is co-led by Gavi (The Vaccine Alliance), Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) and the World Health Organisation (WHO), essentially a risk-hedging mechanism to pool resources to support availability of, and equitable access to, Covid-19 vaccines for all participants, including efforts to raise funds to cover 92 lower income countries or economies.

The Covax Facility promises to deliver at least two billion doses of approved vaccines by the end of 2021, and guarantees access for every participating member country or economy. A widely publicised statement on September 19 from the Science, Technology and Innovation Ministry affirmed that Malaysia will join Covax, but the media has since revealed that Malaysia was still not on the list by September 25.

Science, Technology and Innovation Minister Khairy Jamaluddin clarified on September 29 that the government is still in talks with Covax and, at the same time, may opt for direct supply from pharmaceutical companies without joining it. If the Covax plan sounds so positive and promising, why is the government so hesitant? In this article, I will attempt to illustrate the reservations about Covax as, in any international agreement, the devil is always in the details. 

As an upper middle-income country, Malaysia is considered to be a self-financing country for the Covax plan and thus, has to pay an estimated upfront cost of RM573 million (including financial guarantee) for the “committed purchase arrangement” to cover 20% of our population for a two-dose regime by 2021.

If Malaysia opts for the “optional purchase arrangement”, the government has still to fork out RM190 million (including higher downpayment and risk-sharing guarantee). 

This is not a small sum. Just to compare, under Budget 2020, the amount allocated to the Health Ministry for immunisation and primary healthcare pharmacy supplies purchase is RM846 million (under the Public Health Department). While in March, an additional RM1 billion supplementary budget was allocated to the ministry to curb Covid-19 transmissions, it is unclear whether it has much left.

The stipulated amount of RM190 to RM573 million under the current virus-affected economic climate can be made available for many good social welfare uses.

The issue is beyond the quantum of the upfront payment. When one considers an “insurance plan”, usually one would look at the premium size, compare the risk and benefits, then only conclude whether the plan is worth taking. 

Covax terms these upfront payments as a “speed premium”, which Gavi (the administrator of the Covax Facility) will use to make advanced purchase commitments and “at risk” investments in manufacturers prior to regulatory approval. That amount of investment is to accelerate the manufacturing of promising vaccine candidates while they are being evaluated in clinical trials and before these vaccines have a licence. 

Nine vaccine candidates announced by the WHO in August are currently being evaluated for inclusion in the Covax Facility, and they are in different clinical trial phases. It aims to have an actively managed portfolio of 10-15 vaccine candidates.

This would also mean, due to the difficulty of developing a successful vaccine, many of these investments would be written off if they ultimately fail to achieve regulatory approval. There remains a possibility that all candidates could fail, given the tricky nature of the viral infection and host immune response.

Currently, participating countries have very limited influence in affecting the negotiation progress/outcome with manufacturers. This would all depend on Gavi, with the expectation that it will achieve the lowest possible price for all participants, and that these prices are competitive with those achieved through bilateral deals.

There is no guarantee that the prices will be the best or lowest, and Gavi did not rule out that manufacturers would practise tier-pricing. That also means, the so-called all-inclusive estimated costs per dose at US$10.55 (RM43.80) is just an indicative pricing. The final price of the successful vaccine the manufacturer will have no upper limit, though participating countries have a choice to “skip” those charging more than double the indicative price.

The participant has to pay the adjusted cost per dose after accounting for the spent speed premium, risk mitigation and operational costs incurred by Gavi. There is also no guarantee for a “technology transfer” between vaccine developers and potential local manufacturers; Gavi states that this will be addressed on a “case-by-case basis”.

Thus, the down payment itself, depending on whichever purchase plan the country chooses, will present 15-30% of the premium to the indicative price. It is quite understandable that a smaller country like Malaysia would be afraid to miss the boat, given that Covax has some number of high-profile candidates, but what if the government takes a more cautious approach, and only goes for the successful candidate(s) once the convincing clinical data is presented to the Health Ministry?

The government could make a sizable saving by not committing to Covax, and go into specific target negotiation under the government’s control for bilateral deals. Given Malaysia’s local pharmaceutical industry’s strength, leading manufacturers could have the capacity to produce vaccines domestically. Perhaps this arrangement may not reach the “speed” comparable to Covax, from the government’s point of view, but it makes more sense to balance financial and immunisation needs.

Another big worry about the “speedy nature” of approval is that Covax participants are required to provide indemnity against product liability claims, which means that vaccine manufacturers want a no-fault compensation scheme. This is unacceptable and irresponsible for the public health authority.

Many governments around the world have also attempted to approach vaccine developers; some have made parallel deals even after committing to or expressing intention to join Covax.

In fact, another challenge that Covax faces is that big and powerful nations, such as the US, China and Russia, have opted out, and many rich countries (including the EU) have already signed their own bilateral deals with drug companies and snapped up the majority of the vaccine supply for the next year. More than one billion doses have already been “signed up” by the EU. Covax would have competition and will not be the only game in town striving for the best deal.

Some critics also claim that Covax is not ambitious enough: to achieve global herd immunity and get rid of SARS-CoV2, two billion worldwide doses and 20% coverage are clearly insufficient. Therefore, the best bet that Malaysia government has is beyond Covax as the only solution to vaccine production and distribution.

By right, vaccine developers should also shoulder global social responsibility and give their vaccine products an open licence so they can be manufactured as widely and quickly as possible.

It is good that Malaysia takes a more cautious and flexible approach to find ways to ensure self-sufficiency when it comes to vaccine supply should the day of scientific breakthrough come and the product is proven.

Expanding the capacity of manufacturing them in the country is one important approach. Malaysia should also consider developing vaccines in future, not specific to SARS-CoV2.

In the meantime, social distancing, good personal hygiene practices and strict adherence to SOP should be our “vaccine”. We should not get lax and hinge our hope on vaccine candidates on the Covax list.


22nd article for Agora@TMI column, published on The Malaysian Insight, 5 Oct 2020

兒童營養不良趨向

日前接受黃俊南記者朋友的採訪,以下是他的調查型課題研究分析大作,我僅剪輯有關我發表的意見部分。

東方日報文章(发布于 2020年10月05日):

妈妈买不起奶粉 儿童营养不良趋增

...政策研究员林志翰博士认为,我国出现儿童发育迟缓和营养不良的问题,不能只归因于经济因素,这也与父母的育儿方式和营养知识有关。
他表示,2019年时,我国有21.8%孩子发育迟缓,比起前几年的数据都来得高,也比一些国家如泰国(10.5%)、土耳其(6%)、蒙古(9.4%)近几年的数据高。另外,我国还有14.1%孩童体重过轻和9.5%消瘦。
“尽管我国已属于中高收入国家,这明显显示还有许多儿童营养不良。”
他认为,发育迟缓和消瘦有很多原因。没钱买营养食物是原因之一。2019年报告数据显示,收入低于2000令吉的家庭,有最多发育迟缓的儿童,:收入超过6000令吉的家庭较少。
“无论如何,自从我国推出最低薪金后,我国的家庭收入已稳健成长,许多家庭的财务状况理应改善。”
但他表示,2019年时,我国只有5.6%家庭收入低于2000令吉,这意味著还有许多收入更高的家庭,也出现儿童发育迟缓的问题。
“这些低于5岁的儿童还小,难以决定自己吃什么食物,因此要确保孩子身体健康,很多时候是父母的责任。这与父母的营养知识、家庭生活方式和父母烹饪技巧有关。”
他不认同,营业食物很贵的说法,因为我国的巴刹和商店有充足的蔬菜、豆类、鸡蛋和肉类,这对于收入超过2000令吉的家庭来说是可负担的,但他们需要自己煮食。
“越来越多人,特别是年轻人没在家煮食,而依赖外食。如果他们缺乏购买营养均衡的外食,他们孩子的健康就会受影响。用垃圾食物和快餐来取代营养食物,可导致发育迟缓,但体重未必过轻。”
他补充,根据2016年全国健康和发病率调查报告分析6至23个月幼童的饮食数据显示,只有80.8%孩童每天吃足三餐、66.4%符合最低限度的食物多样性(一天至少4种食物组合)、53.1%符合饮食最低限度的多样性(结合用餐次数和食物多样性),这种情况也出现在高收入群。
他认为,我国有充足和可负担的食物,尽管出现赤贫,但不足以造成那么多孩童营养不良发育迟缓体重过轻,因此认为更大的原因是育儿和营养摄取。
“除了营养,也可能是健康因素,例如早产孩童更大可能出现发育迟缓和体重过轻,或者父母的基因。因此,这应由医生判断是否会构成健康不良。”
林志翰认为,若无法有效解决儿童营养不良问题,卫生部未来需更高拨款来治疗更多病患,而病患家人也需花更多时间就医,乃双输局面。
他提醒,发育迟缓的孩子或造成不可逆转的健康影响,如影响他们的学习能力和工作生产力,他们在与同龄孩童竞争时,也可能处于劣势。
“对于政府,这也是公共医疗的沉重成本,因为这些人更可能出现健康问题而接受治疗。长期来说,这也会影响我国的经济表现。”
他说,政府的营养早餐和牛奶计划,无法让那些5岁以下孩童受惠。虽然政府在孩童首两年,可通过全国疫苗计划进行监督,但有些父母却选择去私人诊所接种疫苗,而错过了让政府介入的机会。
“应透过社区的家庭医生机制,密切监督高风险的孩童,然后通过社区护士或医生进行适当的健康检查和饮食建议,以避免发育迟缓或消瘦的问题。”
他也认为,应加强人民对营养食物的醒觉及实践,年轻一代可能需要通过学校的生活技能课程,强制性学习烹饪。
“在进行产前检查时,也应向孕妇提供营养或饮食知识和建议。”