从联邦直辖区历史看“吉隆坡回归雪州”倡议

 

上周，八打灵再也国会议员李健聪在国会参与第12大马计划中期检讨辩论时，大胆提出了一项建议，即让吉隆坡“回归”雪兰莪州，引起了公众议论纷纷。在他为时约两分钟的演说，健聪透露，这样做的目的是为了要让首都城市能摆脱土地发展限制，与雪州合并以产生经济协同效应。

这样，吉隆坡就可以继续以繁荣且可持续的方式发展，综合公共交通、提供可负担房屋，并统筹整个城市规划，使得吉隆坡可以与区域大都市如新加坡、印尼的雅加达和越南的河内竞争。另外，李健聪也认为此举将第二张选票还给吉隆坡居民，让他们能有代表参与雪州议会，并享受雪州政府提供的福利与津贴。

坦白说，我认为这是一个非常浪漫的想法。健聪认为这是可行的，或许在技术上是这样，但在现实操作中并非如此，即便当初1974年吉隆坡从雪兰莪州分离出来成为联邦直辖区也非易事。考虑是否应将吉隆坡重新并入雪州，我们就得回顾历史，理解为何吉隆坡需要被分离，其中涉及的因素和过程中的代价，皆值得参考。

当年吉隆坡分离最大的导因是1969年大选带来的震撼结果：联盟首次失去了国会的2/3议席，还有槟城（州政权易手）、雪兰莪及霹雳（悬峙议会）的多数议席，这都成为引发513种族冲突的导火线。当年，在野党民政党和民主行动党在雪州大有斩获，特别是在首都——也是雪州首府的吉隆坡（在8个州议席中赢了7席）。

联盟领袖担心，日后若雪州与联邦政权不同调，而吉隆坡又是雪州的首府，可能会引发政治纷争和僵局，从而影响甚至限制国家和首都吉隆坡的发展。再者，即使没有513事件，在马来亚独立初期，联邦政府和首相东姑阿都拉曼已意识到这个局面，早已有讨论和计划协助雪州迁移和建立新首府。

在1958年，联邦政府内阁批准拨款200万令吉给雪州政府，建议将巴生附近的581英亩园丘土地发展为新首府。可惜雪州政府不同意，他们认为该地山丘和斜坡过多，会大幅增加建筑成本，而且由于地点距离吉隆坡较远，不利于商务活动来往。后来，雪州政府选择了Sungai Renggam地区，也就是后来被称为莎阿南的地方，并计划通过建造联邦大道连接两地。

一个大都市的诞生

起草马来亚宪法的莱德委员会曾在1957年建议吉隆坡设为联邦政府能独立管理和施政的行政中心。因此，从1960年开始，联邦政府在吉隆坡市中心开始征地，并在同年通过联邦首都法案来落实这一任务。

513事件为联邦政府和雪州苏丹提供了一个方便的借口，以尽快完成吉隆坡土地分割事宜。然而在1970年，首相阿都拉萨积极拉拢在野党加入并扩大联盟（后来更名为国阵），已成功招揽了民政党和霹雳州的人民进步党，政治危机得以解除，按理说并不需要分割吉隆坡。

事实上，雪州苏丹对于割让吉隆坡一事不太乐意──毕竟，吉隆坡是我国的首座城市。原本市政局的管理范围有93平方公里，但到了1974年，割让转移到联邦直辖区的范围占地扩大到243平方公里。这版图增加的面积已预计了吉隆坡的未来发展，因此，在签署1974年联邦直辖区吉隆坡协议后，海峡时报隔天头条标题为：一个大都市（metropolis）的诞生。

原本联邦政府在1971年计划一并把八打灵也纳入吉隆坡，但遭到当地居民的强烈反对，其中的原因是吉隆坡的门牌税是八打灵的两倍。而州政府也不愿轻易把州内仅有的主要工业区拱手让人。在签署协议之前，当局至少召开了近百场会议和辩论，并接收了多份建议书、意见和方案。毕竟，当时这仍是个敏感且复杂的大课题，政府必须谨慎行事。

此外，值得注意的是，雪州苏丹当初开出的条件是联邦政府必须答应赔偿以资助迁移首府、建设新首府莎阿南的各种主要政府建筑和设施，如州政府大厦、州议会、莎阿南蓝顶大清真寺、图书馆等。联邦政府对州政府的赔偿有两种形式：（一）补偿州政府失去来自吉隆坡的收入，约为每年1830万令吉；（二）补偿州政府在吉隆坡内的建筑和产业，通过协商谈判，最终在1981年确定总值为35亿令吉，其中一大部分后来被用来资助莎阿南体育馆的建设。

因此，问题来了，若联邦政府现在要将吉隆坡归还给雪州，是要无偿转让，还是需要按照当初的条件，如考虑吉隆坡目前的收入和土地与资产的价值？雪州政府能否承担得起？2020年吉隆坡市政厅的收入约为20亿令吉，而雪州政府2023年预算案也仅预计20亿令吉收入。

地方投票权

回到健聪的提议，我认为地名如“雪隆”和“巴生谷”已在我国华社家喻户晓，基本上国人已不太过于关注区分雪州和吉隆坡。2010年推出的国家经济转型计划（Economic Transformation Programme，ETP）设定的国家主要经济区域（National Key Economic Area，NKEA）包括大吉隆坡区-巴生谷（Greater Kuala Lumpur/Klang Valley），并在2011年推出大吉隆坡区-巴生谷公共交通大蓝图，展望未来20年的规划。

这说明，跨州跨地方政府的区域性发展规划并非不可行，也不一定要将吉隆坡重新纳入雪州，才能改善公共交通和房屋供应情况。即使在所谓“精明雪州”倡议下，各个计划如公共巴士、地方基础设施和房屋建设依然存在不少问题，其效率和优越性并未超越吉隆坡市政厅的管理。

我绝对赞成吉隆坡居民应有地方投票权。既然希盟竞选宣言已承诺要率先举行吉隆坡市长选举，然后在吉隆坡推行地方选举选出市议员。我认为应优先实施这些，而不是复杂且难度极高的吉隆坡回归雪州方案。若吉隆坡能够成功做到，这将为全国各州恢复地方选举提供了一个良好范例，这难道不是更好、一举多得的政策选择吗？健聪，请继续在国会推动地方选举，加油！

刊登于《東方日報》《群議良策》專欄2023年9月20日 

東方臉書鏈接

主要參考資料來源：

An Anguish Cession: Issues during the Shaping of the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur, 1974

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/286702161_An_Anguish_Cession_Issues_during_the_Shaping_of_the_Federal_Territory_of_Kuala_Lumpur_1974

LENS: KL  Story time: The formation of the first Federal Territory, and then some…

https://www.thevibes.com/articles/culture/59902/story-time-the-formation-of-the-first-federal-territory-and-then-some

Reform electoral system for diversity of representation

 

Were the voters in the six state elections happy with the results? Did their vote produce the desired outcome?

Votes for the losing side did nothing more than contribute to the statistics. Those whose parties lost must have felt that their votes were “wasted”.

Due to malapportionment, urban seats such Kinrara and Subang Jaya have about six times more voters than Sabak Bernam, the smallest seat in Selangor. The landslide wins of by more than 50,000 votes in the two urban seats count for only two seats in the state assembly, so even the voters on the winning side would feel that their votes were heavily diluted.

Malaysia’s first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system has many weaknesses and is increasingly out of step with the diversity of voices in a democracy.

Because of its “winner takes all” design, it is not equitable for voters who wish to express and translate their support for specific political parties or candidates into representation in the state assembly. Consequently, it does not uphold the fundamental principles of electoral democracy, which include the notion of “one person, one vote, one value,” for equitable outcomes.

Most notably, I believe the suppression of third parties and alternative voices is particularly concerning as the system consistently encourages tactical voting, where voters are prompted to select the side most likely to win.

Hence, the election results often fail to reflect the true extent of support for third parties and alternative candidates, as they would in a proportional electoral system.

Election campaigns often see the two main coalition parties vilifying each other and instilling fear among their target constituencies.

Perikatan Nasional exploited the concerns of Malay-Muslims about losing power to the DAP-led coalition of Pakatan Harapan (PH), which propagated fearmongering among non-Malay communities regarding the “green wave.”

This left voters feeling disconnected and despondent – and confronted with the challenging decision of choosing the “lesser of two evils”.

The two major coalitions, especially PH and its supporters, would accuse third parties such as Muda and Parti Sosialis Malaysia (PSM) of splitting the votes.

Such statements are undemocratic and show disrespect for the voters’ rights and desire for alternative representation.

Due to the prevalence of tactical voting and fear-mongering, the number of votes for Muda and PSM in the recent state elections may not accurately reflect the level of support for the two parties.

In the recent Selangor elections, Muda and PSM secured a median of 3.45% and 2.15% of the vote, respectively, in the seats they contested.

Although they did not win any of the seats and forfeited their deposits (the threshold being 12.5%), the electoral pact won a total of 34,009 votes across 18 seats. Their vote share also exceeded the median of other third parties (1%), independents (1.2%), and spoiled votes (0.5%).

Hence, Muda and PSM effectively constituted the third political force.

Contrary to some beliefs, there was a weak but statistically significant positive correlation between the vote share of Muda-PSM and that of PH-Umno. In other words, the trend suggests that Muda-PSM received more votes and performed slightly better in traditional PH strongholds.

Instead of acting as “spoilers,” Muda-PSM were shown to be drawing votes away from PH’s primary opponent and stood poised to replace PN as the second-largest party in those constituencies.

It is true that in the two constituencies (Dengkil and Sungai Kandis) that transitioned from PH to PN-Bersatu, PSM and Muda received more votes than the margin of victory.

However, it would be presumptuous to claim these votes as PH’s if PSM and Muda had not contested.

Some oppose altering the FPTP system, contending that a proportional representation system would exacerbate societal fragmentation and encourage radical political forces.

Yet, when we examine the state of party politics in Malaysia today, we already observe numerous well-established political parties, resulting in a “fragmented” political landscape.

Moreover, even mainstream parties have radical factions and can contribute to the polarisation of our society.

So, what do we stand to lose by allowing voters to cast their ballots for their preferred party and have those cumulative votes directly translate into a specific number of seats and public funding support (provided the votes surpass a certain threshold)?

Shouldn’t democracy encompass inclusivity, valuing the choices of the minority and celebrating the diversity of representative voices?

I’m sick of being forced to eat a “less rotten” apple. Could I not have a healthy watermelon or papaya?

If we could change the electoral system to one of proportional representation, there will be more fresh fruits  available for the choosing and every voter will contribute to making them available.

170th article for Agora@TMI column, published on The Malaysian Insight, 4 Sep 2023