給禹丞的公開信（2018聖誕節）

給禹丞的公開信：

好久沒給你寫信。你成長得那麼快，很快就會讀懂我寫給你的信了。今天下午你麻麻才傳給我短信，問我去年在這個時候有沒有給你寫信。很抱歉，去年底好像特別忙，現在我又不記得忙些什麼了。你媽那麼問，因為她今天看到我在兩年前為你寫的信啊！那時你才7個月大。時光飛逝。

麻麻說，今年好像只有她有聖誕禮物，問我要些什麼。其實，我個人沒有要些什麼給自己。有禹丞那麼懂事可愛的開心果，就很好了啊！我們都很期待明年妹妹的到來，那已是一個未來的大禮了。剛才我們才輪流對妹妹祝賀Merry Christmas,明年我們見！禹丞已懂分辨誰才是他的妹妹….不是那些阿姨叔叔們的“妹妹”，他的妹妹在媽媽肚裡。我看著你那麼溫柔地sayang妹妹，感到很欣慰。你說你已是禹丞哥哥了，會讓出床位給妹妹（其實近期你也沒睡在那裡了）、玩玩具娛樂妹妹、還說會買‘禮物’給妹妹（但問你要買什麼的時候，你說要買火車‘train-track’😅）。我想，妹妹肯定會很喜歡你的，我也相信你會是妹妹的好榜樣。

近期因為托兒所那裡傳來手足口症，你也不幸成為托兒所裡最後被傳染的一位。慶幸的是，你僅是輕微生病，比較心疼你吞嚥進食的痛苦而已，其他時候你還是一如往常地活潑，沒大礙。你也很明白自己生病，所以不出門。就這樣你從週五開始就沒出門，直到今天下午，我們看到你的紅色斑點已退食慾已回，才讓你有限度地出門坐粑粑車去遊車河。我們確實錯過了與同事朋友去林明的旅程聚會，但這幾天我們也算相處愉快吧！至少粑粑自從週四晚就每餐都下廚為你準備食物，吃的還好吧？

自從麻麻開始上班，我們為你挑選、把你送去一個歡樂場所的托兒所，我們絕對看到了你的迅速成長。你的老師們都說，你是該所的其中兩個‘天使’之一，人人都喜歡你。我們為你可以融入大孩班，並從玩樂中學習良多，感到驕傲。在該處你必須與朋友老師以英語溝通，在家主要說華語的你，很快地就學習了不少英語，甚至可以明白我的同事朋友跟你的談話，很厲害！我們對你從日常生活對話裡學習到的詞語，還有你的超強記憶，偶爾還是感到驚喜連連。我對麻麻說，我們之間好像沒有可以秘密且順利溝通的第三語了…馬來語福建話廣東話德語，麻麻不太行；日語，粑粑不行；我們其中一人會的語言，包括瑞典語、潮州話都少過半桶水，真的沒法啦！誰叫你的英語進步神速？（其實，我與麻麻有試過一個方程式，就是她說英語，我回廣東話…最後還是覺得很彆扭，沒有持續很久）

我們那天對你毫不怯場的舞台跳舞表演感到驚喜（麻麻還喜極而泣呢！）。你的老師說，綵排的時候，你都不太愛動，表演的時候靈魂天份和魅力全都釋放出來！很有表演欲哦，我們很高興能當場見證並用相機錄下來那些片段。坦白說，我也因為你的學校選唱Satu Malaysia的歌，才開始接觸那首歌和懂得其中的歌詞，呵呵。你那麼會唱，在家裡也愛唱，唱到七情上臉，呃，國歌你都還不會唱咧？等下人家問我你愛Satu Malaysia是不是愛納吉時，我要怎樣解釋？😆

還有，你把你的best buddy死黨Noah（馬來裔）叫成‘阿華’（廣東音），是要怎樣？聽說你的叫法，全學校都懂，有時他們還逗趣模仿你這樣叫阿華呢！你真的很Satu Malaysia！童言無忌啦，不過，真的很可愛。‘肥肥’阿姨剛聽到這則故事時，也笑得嘴不合攏，你真天才！可是吼，你也不需要跟著阿華他做什麼你就做什麼啦，雖然我知道你喜歡他，呵呵。你的朋友Kay Kay和Caleb也很落力跟你一起玩啊，做莫你對他們沒有同等的熱情？

我們粑粑麻麻在家對你可說是‘相敬如賓’了，尊重你有時的選擇和作風。如果我們認為不適合或不應該的時候，你已到了一個階段開始可以與我們在言語上‘談判式’溝通。我們總是不運用大人的‘暴力’屈你就範，那是我們的last resort。其實你還真是個談判對手，我們粑粑麻麻總得想得出一些另類/創意的條件或稍微妥協，換取你的同意做一些我們認為適時的日常事情。大部分時間，你還算是通情達理，總算不浪費我們的腦汁和唇舌。當然，你還小，有時也難免因為心情或喜好而固執/執著，我們才不得已用‘暴力’（比如說，應該沒有小孩會喜歡吃藥這回事的，你生病的時候，這個真的沒有辦法咯）。你對媽媽短暫離別有時候也是歇斯底里，但是我已身經百戰，我有耐心讓你慢慢沉澱，最壞的情況也只是半小時而已。近來我可以在10分鐘內讓你接受事實並接納替代安慰。

近來麻麻因公事出差到吉蘭丹，我們跟著去。趁麻麻做工時，我甚至已可以帶你一個小瓜開車去玩大約3天，我們還好好、蠻開心的。看吧，我已證明了給麻麻看，我差不多是時候可以帶你獨個兒出國/出去旅遊了，到時我們的旅程一定不一樣。謝謝你那麼通情諒解，你知道粑粑比較不拘小節一點，隨便有時也有隨便的好啦😝。

因為很久沒給你寫信了，一寫就寫了這麼多，就算是對過去這麼久沒寫給你的一些補償吧，呵呵。

聖誕節快樂，我的兒！明年我們的聖誕節就會多了一個妹妹一起慶祝咯！（下次寫信，要寫給你們倆了）

祝快高快樂成長，

粑粑

25.12.2018 （平安夜起筆）

Interview with IDN TIMES journalist concerning ICERD ratification

Below are the email exchange/conversation on the questions posted to me by the IDN TIMES journalist Rosa:

The journalist asked: 

i) what's the reason behind this and why it's time for Malaysia to ratify ICERD? 

My reply: 

It began with the Pakatan Harapan GE14 Manifesto, under the Promise 26 entitlted "Make our human rights record respected by the world" it states "Suitable international conventions that are not yet ratified will be ratified as soon as possible, including the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights."

Then subsequently the Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad took to the United Nations podium in New York to speak during the General Debate of the 73rd session of the General Assembly on 28th September this year. That speech won a lot of applauses and approvals from Malaysia and all around the world, and seemingly affirmed to more human rights-based approaches and democracy promises. On the very issue regarding human right convention, below is the relevant speech text:

"9. The new Malaysia will firmly espouse the principles promoted by the UN in our international engagements. These include the principles of truth, human rights, the rule of law, justice, fairness, responsibility and accountability, as well as sustainability. It is within this context that the new government of Malaysia has pledged to ratify all remaining core UN instruments related to the protection of human rights. "

Fast forward to 24th October, P. Waytha Moorthy, the Minister in the Prime Minister's Department came out with a statement pledged that the government is committed to ratify all remaining 6 human-rights related treaties including ICERD in the first quarter of next year. This has initiated a strong anti-ICERD movement.

Why is it time for Malaysia to ratify the ICERD treaty? it is long overdue for the Malaysian government to do so, as Malaysia is only one of the 14 countries in the world which has not signed and ratified the treaty. The previous government Barisan Nasional might be reluctant to, because the legitimacy of their ruling based on large electorates/voters who support the Ketuanan Melayu / Malay Supremacy idea (which institutionalise racial discrimination). There is nothing wrong about the ICERD, and if the government is serious about signing and ratification of the treaty, they could still maintain the current affirmative action which favour Bumiputera/Malay ethnic. BUT they are required to also publish a timeline and intended measurable target for those affimative action measures. A fair-minded person would agree, those who believe in Malay Supremacy do not. So they misled and stoked fear among Malay communities about the 'consequences' of ICERD.

ii) Have you ever experienced first-hand discrimination as a result of the infamous Article 153? And if so, do you think by ratifying ICERD something significant will change in a positive way?

My reply:

The special privileges given/accorded under the Article 153 in the Malaysian Federal Constitution are these 3 categories:

1) Positions in the public service

2) Scholarships, exhibitions and other similar educational or training privileges or special facilities

3) Permit or licence is required for the operation of any trade or business

To ask if one feel 'discriminated', that would be depending on whether he/she is competing directly with the Malay/Natives on the 3 categories above. However, if they are positive discrimination measures ('affirmative actions) and are properly set out, other ethnicities should not feel aggrieved about discrimation due to losing out. Malaysia is unusual in a way that these affimative actions targeted at the majority not the minorities of the nation. Some of my Chinese and Indian ethnic friends did not get into their preferred public university or course due to the 'quota' set up in favour of Malay/ Bumiputera. The fact is also true that positions in the public service, especially most top positions in the leadership and management, are preoccupied by Malays/Bumiputera, many minorities ethnic claim that there is a ceiling in promotion, that would also results in 'discrimination' to them. Finally, regarding land and property purchase, it is a fact that bumiputera enjoy privilege in getting discount and favourable list. If the government does not set a timeline and measurable target for those affirmative actions, this would seriously harm the efforts by the government to promote harmony and unity in this country. The government needs to regularly use evidences and facts to justify the continuation of affirmative actions based on ethinicity.

By ratifying ICERD, this would push the government and all communities to engage in conversation about long term fairness and equality in Malaysian society, the government could review the current policies based on the evidence, consensus building and rational approach to meet the expectation of the New Malaysia. The government has to show their political will and strongly campaign to assuage the fear of certain community.  Righy now, a lot of misinformation and misunderstanding from the anti-ICERD opponents are circulating around, and this is the point I think the government did not do well and conceded too early.

iii) Now, what makes PH backtrack from the plan to ratify ICERD? Do they have the same mindset as BN in terms of securing support from the majority?

My reply:First you have to understand the dynamics within the PH coalition. PH itself did not secure the majority votes among Malay communities during GE14, maybe about 1/3 strong only and split with UMNO and PAS. Now UMNO and PAS work together in Malay-Muslim communcal political agenda, and champion the anti-ICERD campaign. The dominant parties in the current PH coalition are multiracial parties, where the non-muslim MPs are quite significant. Often this PH coalition gave the Malay community impression that it has weaken Malay's mandate in governance, even though the PM right now is from PPBM a bumiputera-champion party to rival UMNO. 

Due to the Malay votes deficit, and also Dr Mahathir's agenda to break and destroy his old party UMNO, he is now actively enticing the crossovers from UMNO to his own party to strengthen his hands in the PH coalition. Given how unpopular now is ICERD among the Malay communities after active campaigns by PAS and UMNO (one should not forget that some major Malay media press are still in the hands of UMNO), Dr Mahathir could not insist on ICERD while luring UMNO to crossover. He and his party want to be seen championing Malay rights back home (not at the UN HQ), that is why some members from his own party already went to media to stage their protest against ICERD too, together with Amanah, a minor Islamist democratic party.

Another factor is, there are upcoming 2 by-elections coming up, one in Negeri Sembilan which is a Malay-majority seat. Dr. Mahathir would not want the anti-ICERD sentiment to brew over too much until his coaltion would lose in the by-election otherwise that would boost the confidence of his main political opponents now, eg. UMNO, and make the UMNO MP crossovers harder to realise due to hesitation about future contest under the PH banner.

So, in short, what makes Dr Mahathir and the PH government backtrack is mostly due to political reason. If he is a true believer in what he said at the UN General Assembly, I cannot give you an answer for sure.

iv) Also, correct me if I’m wrong, the fundamental problem for ICERD supporters is not the existing affirmative action, but how to measure the goals? And once they are achieved then that will be the time for Malaysia to abandon such policy?

My reply:

ICERD supporters, in my opinion, are those who really believe in inclusive, free and fair Malaysia moving away from race-based politics. They might have realised how the so called affirmative actions have been abused in the past and currently they feel that Malay communities should be ready and can have the confidence to compete fairly based on merits. Even for those who have reservation and are in favour to maintain the affirmative action status quo, they might take it as a tactical move to allay the fear of the Malay community, while persuading the government and people to just sign it because those bumiputera policies would not need to be abolished right away. I would personally believe that the ICERD supporters would be happy to do away with the affirmative action if it outlasts its usefulness, and if greater equity has been achieved. To insist keeping the affirmative action beyond the intended targets, how is it not deemed to be racial discrimination? this will not do any good to the nation-building process.

The news article in the end came out here:

https://www.idntimes.com/news/world/rosa-folia/aksi-812-dan-supremasi-melayu-muslim-di-mata-warga-negara-malaysia/full

A government ill-prepared for ICERD

THE issue of the ratification of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, or ICERD, caused quite a commotion in Malaysia recently, stirring up Malay-Muslim nationalist and supremacist sentiments, and culminating in an anti-ICERD rally that took place in  Kuala Lumpur last Saturday – where the police estimated a turnout of 55,000.

Disappointingly, Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad reiterated that the government will not ratify the treaty because “it does not allow the government to provide affirmative action based on race… and we will not amend our constitution”.

The government’s current stand on ICERD contradicts the position taken by Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department P. Waytha Moorthy, who had declared that Pakatan Harapan would sign and ratify the remaining six core human rights international treaties by the first quarter of 2019 – including ICERD. This U-turn seems to suggest that the anti-ICERD protesters are in the right – but are they, really?

ICERD is not complicated, nor is it difficult to agree to – worldwide, only 14 nations have yet to sign the 53-year-old treaty. Malaysia is one of them, alongside Brunei, Myanmar, North Korea, and some small Pacific island countries. ICERD has 25 articles in its provisions, but the core principles and definitions are contained in the first seven articles (Part I).

The preamble of ICERD cites many principles originating from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; for example, “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights”, as well as “all human beings are equal before the law and are entitled to equal protection of the law against any discrimination”.

ICERD also states that “any doctrine of superiority based on racial differentiation is scientifically false, morally condemnable, socially unjust and dangerous, and that there is no justification for racial discrimination, in theory or in practice, anywhere”. These are very basic and fundamental principles of humanity.

Given a choice, no one would openly admit that they are “racist”. The common defence these people use are proclaiming that they have friends from other ethnicity, implying that “naturally” they do not discriminate or exclude others. By and large, the most contentious point when it comes to identifying a racist is the definition of “racial discrimination”.

But Article 1 of ICERD has a clearly elaborated definition. The anti-ICERD individuals either did not understand, and consequently misinterpreted, the treaty text, or had failed to read it and subsequently were misled and manipulated by others with a political agenda.

A third possibility is that they may truly believe that differential treatment based on race is fair and should be allowed in perpetuity. Some of them claim that defending the rights of one particular race is not discrimination, and that the special position of the Malay race, as stipulated in the federal constitution (e.g. Article 153), should be retained.

On the other hand, Article 5(vii) of ICERD is often cited by opponents to accuse ICERD of implicating religious equality, when the actual content is not to discuss the position of religion but against racial discrimination in practicing the freedom of religion.

Based on past actions, the opponents of ICERD have provoked fear in the public realm, reiterating exaggerating claims that the Malays’ special position and Bumiputera privileges would be eroded and, eventually, totally repealed, if the government were to sign and ratify ICERD.

In fact, Articles 1(4) and 2(2) of ICERD clearly state that affirmative action and protection for certain racial or ethnic groups shall NOT be deemed as racial discrimination. The caveat is that affirmative policies must have a deadline; in other words, they must be discontinued if the policy has already achieved its intended target.

Many ongoing Bumiputera policies do not even have measurable targets and deadlines; in theory, these would have to be remedied and amended in order to fulfill the principles and spirit of the ICERD. I believe this is fair and just, because if the government wants to have affirmative action, the prerequisite is to prove that a certain racial group is still lagging behind and still needs state assistance.

If the situation of a certain group has improved vastly to the point of achieving equal footing with other races, then it would be hard to see how such policies are not advocating racial discrimination, if the government still insists on and persists with a flawed policy framework that benefits only a particular race.

In fact, affirmative action as practiced in many countries is beneficial to minorities – our government’s response is that we have different national conditions. However, the government probably does not want to admit directly that the Bumiputera privilege policies are temporary affirmative measures.

The New Economic Policy launched in the 70s mentioned a target to achieve 30% Bumiputera equity in the stock market, but up until today, there have been no updates on the status of this target, and whether it has actually been met. The NEP officially ended in 1990, but its basic form and spirit still lives on in many of our current policies. The Pakatan Harapan government seems satisfied to follow the status quo.

I wonder – when the government announced that they were going to ratify the six treaties, were they really prepared to run a strong publicity campaign to convince the public of the good behind why they wanted to do it? Given the general lack of public’s basic awareness of human rights, and the fact that most are still living within environments where racism is rather prevalent, the government should have anticipated fast-spreading opposition to ICERD, and responded effectively to the mistruths spun out in public. In this way, they could have brought the unnecessary vitriol under control.

The federal government has the advantage of huge machineries and resources to run a convincing positive campaign for policies it favours, instead of taking a defensive position. From the start, the government could have been swift to spell out its intended reservations, such as a promise not to make any amendments to the federal constitution (as with the United States and Thailand). Yet, it failed to take these early precautions, and when it finally did, it was too little and too late.

On the issues of social justice and equality, a responsible government with a reform agenda and political will must do the right things as promised, and stand firm on acting in the best interests of the nation, even though it might not appear to be a well-received populist policy.

This must come hand-in-hand with ensuring proper strategic planning. In the face of doubts and challenges, the government’s stand and arguments have to be rationally sound, complete, and persuasive.

The more U-turns a government makes on policies, the more it will lose its credibility, in the eyes of both supporters and opponents.

The article was published here at The Malaysian Insight, Voices, Dec 11, 2018.

The Original title is " ICERD U-turn, what is next?"

ICERD U转，何去何从？

《消除一切形式种族歧视国际公约》（ICERD，下文简称《消》）是我国尚未签署的6项攸关人权的国际公约之一；我国只签了3个。事实上，在1965年发起的《消》是其中一个最早的人权公约，当时马来西亚才刚成立了2年。那时多国面临严峻的种族歧视挑战，南非正值实行备受谴责的种族隔离政策（Apartheid）。时空辗转，今年《消》就快踏入53週年了，我国仍是剩余尚未签署的少数14国之一，与汶莱、缅甸和朝鲜並列。

希望联盟在竞选宣言里承诺要让我国在人权记录上获得全世界的尊重，並「尽快」签署和批准「合適」的国际公约。文件里只提及《公民与政治权利国际公约》一条，而不是《消》，但站在人权进步的立场和原则上，常扬言要摒除国阵的种族主义救国的希盟很难推拒说《消》不是「合適」的条约。

政府捍卫不力

自从首相署部长瓦塔姆迪在10月24日公开表示希盟政府决心要在明年首季签署和批准6项人权国际公约，包括《消》，打开了这个潘朵拉盒。他成为反对派眾矢之的，而这个课题延烧了差不多一个月，期间有巫统联手伊党反对、盟党诚信党也跟著反对、首相说全面落实《消》近乎不可能，直到11月23日首相署发出文告，表明政府决定U转不签署《消》。

但事情仍未告一段落：资深国会议员林吉祥语出惊人说不要《消》成为513种族衝突再现的代价，而反《消》运动的领导决议继续12月8日的示威游行。目前的局势让维护人权进步的支持者沮丧，所谓「新」马来西亚的种族主义火焰仍盛，强大威猛至改变了政府的决策。政府支持者或许认为这是策略性需要先妥协退一步，其他的《消》支持者看到的则是政府因无法捍卫政策而节节败退、最后选择弃保。

反对种族歧视原则

《消》真的很复杂、很难认同吗？《消》的条文有25项，但真正阐述原则和约束范围的是仅前面7项。《消》的引言提出很多原则源自於《世界人权宣言》，例如：「人人生而自由、在尊严和权利方面一律平等」，「在法律面前人人平等，均受法律保护免於被歧视」。《消》也说明任何基於族群差別而產生的优越论，在科学上站不住脚、道德上可谴责、社会上不公义及危险。有歧视的地方就是人与人、国与国之间的友好和谐关係的障碍。不管在哪里，种族歧视无法被合理化。

我想，没有人喜欢被称为种族主义者，或公开说他们爱以肤色血统背景歧视他人。这些人最爱以他身边有其他种族朋友为证，说明他没有排斥或歧视其他种族的意思。或许最大的爭议在於何谓「种族歧视」？公约里的第一条就完整详尽地解释了定义。反《消》人士若不是没读懂条约內容而错误詮释、没读就被人误导，再不然就是由衷地相信族群差別待遇应永远存在。他们声称捍卫族群权益是维权不是歧视，宪法上的马来人特別地位（比如第153条文）绝对要保留。既然如此，为何他们心虚不肯让政府签？

不少反对派就针对马来人特別地位以及土著特权课题煽动炒作，说一旦签署和批准《消》就会逐步或一併取消。事实上，《消》的第一条文第4项，以及第二条文第2项清楚表明种族扶弱政策不属於种族歧视。但关键在於，条文里也说明扶弱政策不能永无止境没期限，同时若扶弱目標已达到就不应继续存在。

先不谈宪法上的马来人特別地位，目前很多的土著特权政策甚至没置入可衡量的具体目標和期限，理论上必须修法或修订政策才能符合《消》的原则和精神。我认为这相当公平，毕竟要扶弱，前提是要证明某群体仍处於弱势；一旦这已不再是事实，要继续实施利惠单一群体的公共政策怎能不构成种族歧视？

很多国家扶弱政策的对象是少数民族，我国政府可声称国情不一样。可惜政府不愿直接承认目前的土著特权政策就是暂时性的扶弱政策。70年代初推行的《新经济政策》曾提及的30%土著股权目標，后来也不了了之，不再去强调和展示现况数据。《新经济政策》虽然在期限和名义上已在1990年终止，但其精神继续蔓延至今，並涵盖广泛的政策层面。新政府依然遵循。

笔者不解的是，希盟政府当初宣佈要签署《消》及其他5项人权国际公约，是否有做好政策宣传和解说的准备功夫，以便可有效地控制和回应那些煽动情绪道听途说的不实传言？毕竟政府有庞大的政治机关和资源可应付。比如说，牵涉宗教的《消》第5条文vii项常被反对派摘录，但该条文的本位是禁止种族歧视他人行使宗教自由，而不是討论宗教地位。遗憾的是，那些企图把宗教与种族混淆视听的有心人靠似是而非的言论批评政府迅速获得支持，政府似乎招架无力。

政府有保留主动权

再说，当初政府宣佈要签署《消》的时候若强调对《消》某些条文有所保留（可效仿美国和泰国在不修改宪法下的签约条件），並保证不修改我国宪法第153条文，或许就能先防御和降温公眾的反对舆论。部长后来的澄清为时已晚，后知后觉。

更遗憾的是，政府一直处於防守，没有很好地主动说服民眾为何需要签署这6项人权国际公约。別说除了《消》一般民眾还能说出其他公约的名字，他们连基本人权教育和认知都已十分匱乏，再加上生活在种族主义仍笼罩普及的环境下，政府不可能不知道民间会出现反对浪潮。

在社会正义和公平原则上，有政治改革决心的负责任政府，要做的是正確且符合国家社会长远利益的事，既使当下那不是受欢迎的民粹政策。既然决意要改革，就要確保策划妥当；纵使面对质疑挑战，政策论述要理性完整且有说服力。政府有越多的政策U转，在支持和反对两派的眼里就越没有公信力。但事情仍未告一段落：资深国会议员林吉祥语出惊人说不要《消》成为513种族衝突再现的代价，而反《消》运动的领导决议继续12月8日的示威游行。目前的局势让维护人权进步的支持者沮丧，所谓「新」马来西亚的种族主义火焰仍盛，强大威猛至改变了政府的决策。政府支持者或许认为这是策略性需要先妥协退一步，其他的《消》支持者看到的则是政府因无法捍卫政策而节节败退、最后选择弃保。

反对种族歧视原则

《消》真的很复杂、很难认同吗？《消》的条文有25项，但真正阐述原则和约束范围的是仅前面7项。《消》的引言提出很多原则源自於《世界人权宣言》，例如：「人人生而自由、在尊严和权利方面一律平等」，「在法律面前人人平等，均受法律保护免於被歧视」。《消》也说明任何基於族群差別而產生的优越论，在科学上站不住脚、道德上可谴责、社会上不公义及危险。有歧视的地方就是人与人、国与国之间的友好和谐关係的障碍。不管在哪里，种族歧视无法被合理化。

我想，没有人喜欢被称为种族主义者，或公开说他们爱以肤色血统背景歧视他人。这些人最爱以他身边有其他种族朋友为证，说明他没有排斥或歧视其他种族的意思。或许最大的爭议在於何谓「种族歧视」？公约里的第一条就完整详尽地解释了定义。反《消》人士若不是没读懂条约內容而错误詮释、没读就被人误导，再不然就是由衷地相信族群差別待遇应永远存在。他们声称捍卫族群权益是维权不是歧视，宪法上的马来人特別地位（比如第153条文）绝对要保留。既然如此，为何他们心虚不肯让政府签？

不少反对派就针对马来人特別地位以及土著特权课题煽动炒作，说一旦签署和批准《消》就会逐步或一併取消。事实上，《消》的第一条文第4项，以及第二条文第2项清楚表明种族扶弱政策不属於种族歧视。但关键在於，条文里也说明扶弱政策不能永无止境没期限，同时若扶弱目標已达到就不应继续存在。

先不谈宪法上的马来人特別地位，目前很多的土著特权政策甚至没置入可衡量的具体目標和期限，理论上必须修法或修订政策才能符合《消》的原则和精神。我认为这相当公平，毕竟要扶弱，前提是要证明某群体仍处於弱势；一旦这已不再是事实，要继续实施利惠单一群体的公共政策怎能不构成种族歧视？

很多国家扶弱政策的对象是少数民族，我国政府可声称国情不一样。可惜政府不愿直接承认目前的土著特权政策就是暂时性的扶弱政策。70年代初推行的《新经济政策》曾提及的30%土著股权目標，后来也不了了之，不再去强调和展示现况数据。《新经济政策》虽然在期限和名义上已在1990年终止，但其精神继续蔓延至今，並涵盖广泛的政策层面。新政府依然遵循。

笔者不解的是，希盟政府当初宣佈要签署《消》及其他5项人权国际公约，是否有做好政策宣传和解说的准备功夫，以便可有效地控制和回应那些煽动情绪道听途说的不实传言？毕竟政府有庞大的政治机关和资源可应付。比如说，牵涉宗教的《消》第5条文vii项常被反对派摘录，但该条文的本位是禁止种族歧视他人行使宗教自由，而不是討论宗教地位。遗憾的是，那些企图把宗教与种族混淆视听的有心人靠似是而非的言论批评政府迅速获得支持，政府似乎招架无力。

政府有保留主动权

再说，当初政府宣佈要签署《消》的时候若强调对《消》某些条文有所保留（可效仿美国和泰国在不修改宪法下的签约条件），並保证不修改我国宪法第153条文，或许就能先防御和降温公眾的反对舆论。部长后来的澄清为时已晚，后知后觉。

更遗憾的是，政府一直处於防守，没有很好地主动说服民眾为何需要签署这6项人权国际公约。別说除了《消》一般民眾还能说出其他公约的名字，他们连基本人权教育和认知都已十分匱乏，再加上生活在种族主义仍笼罩普及的环境下，政府不可能不知道民间会出现反对浪潮。

在社会正义和公平原则上，有政治改革决心的负责任政府，要做的是正確且符合国家社会长远利益的事，既使当下那不是受欢迎的民粹政策。既然决意要改革，就要確保策划妥当；纵使面对质疑挑战，政策论述要理性完整且有说服力。政府有越多的政策U转，在支持和反对两派的眼里就越没有公信力。

刊登于《東方日報》東方文薈版2018年12月2日

Is the 2019 health budget well placed?

On November 2, Finance Minister Lim Guan Eng presented the first budget from the new ruling Pakatan Harapan coalition, including allocations of operating and development expenditure to the Ministry of Health (MOH). Most observers expected the government to fulfil its pre-election manifesto promises, such as increasing MOH’s budget allocation to 4% of GDP; the implementation of “Skim Peduli Sihat”; the tackling of non-communicable and rare diseases; and strengthening partnership and collaboration with the private sector and NGOs.

I analysed the MOH budget from two perspectives: first, through the policies and programmes announced in the speech, and second, the estimated federal budget for each department within the MOH. Both the share and absolute amount of the budget allocation are important determinants.

Happily, the MOH allocation for 2019 has reached historic heights, totalling RM28.7 billion. Compared with Budget 2018, the health budget has increased by 7.9%, and takes a 9.1% share of the total federal budget. However, the current allocation equates to only 1.87% of GDP – an almost unchanged figure since the last budget. Health Minister Dr Dzulkefly Ahmad conceded that this round of allocations is unlikely to fulfil Pakatan Harapan’s manifesto pledge to devote 4% GDP spending on the public healthcare sector; instead, he proposed to establish the Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) to raise an additional RM3 billion. In the budget speech, the finance minister only mentioned the airport REIT, while hinting that hospitals could also be a possibility in future. Raising public funds through this REIT approach sounds as if the government is doing business, and some in the public might not approve of such a controversial plan.

Prior to the budget, the “Skim Peduli Sihat” proposal had been widely discussed. In his speech, the finance minister had announced and rebranded it as the National Health Protection Fund (NHPF). This is a medical-related social welfare programme aiming to help people from the bottom 40% low income households (B40). Unexpectedly, a private healthcare insurance company will contribute RM2 billion in initial seed funding to the same fund managed by Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM). Some have reservations if such a fund pooling mechanism would present a conflict of interest. According to The Edge, the company is looking to negotiate a deal with the government to be exempt from the new requirement of maximum 70% foreign ownership of local insurance businesses, with this contribution. 

The NHPF programme will provide medical care in private medical institutions free of charge only for four critical illnesses. The maximum annual claim threshold given per person (or household?) is capped at RM8,000. This is contrary to the news reported few months ago that the programme will provide the B40 with between RM10,000 - RM20,000 per household, for in-patient care at private hospitals – without stating the restriction of illness categories. To date, which four illnesses the MOH intends to cover is still uncertain, but if these were serious and critical illness, RM8,000 is a mere drop in the bucket. What if these B40 patients find that their medical fees heavily exceed RM8,000 – should they be held liable? What is the claim mechanism for the benefits? Can a B40 patient go directly to a relevant specialist in any private hospital? If the government does not have a good system of claims management, in addition to government provision of RM50 daily hospitalisation income (maximum of 14 days per year), private hospitals are likely to receive a higher number of B40 patients with these critical illnesses and ultimately gain the most benefits from this programme.

Living up to MOH’s commitment to reduce the incidence of non-communicable diseases, a few progressive policies have been proposed, such as the sugar-sweetened beverages excise tax. The sugar tax is fixed at 40 sen per litre, if the beverage exceeds a certain concentration of added sugar content. In my opinion, the magnitude of the excise tax is not large enough to disincentive consumption. Unless the government continues to campaign heavily against high sugar-laden food and beverages, we should not expect this policy to significantly alter people’s food-consumption behaviour, or reduce obesity levels. On the other hand, the government’s determination and efforts at meeting its goal of a smoke-free Malaysia by 2045 are more obvious, with stringent measures to curb smoking in public.

Furthermore, the government should be applauded for a special budget allocation to treat rare diseases, strengthen primary healthcare, and provide health screening services to B40 senior citizens aged 50 and above. These actions reflect the ruling coalition’s election promises, and more are appropriate and timely public health policy directions to take.

Preventive care ensures residents become healthier in the future. However, for those who are currently suffering from various diseases, there is still a need for affordable, accessible and quality medical care. The current budget allocates RM10.8 billion for drugs and supplies purchases, as well as funding to upgrade and improve the quality of healthcare services in government clinics and hospitals. Comparing allocations between Budgets 2018 and 2019, MOH will have RM88 million more in funding for the purchase of drugs and medical products. 

Allocations for public health reflect the government’s policies in strengthening preventive care and primary healthcare, such as providing wider selections of free vaccination and health screening services. The current MOH budget has seen an increase of RM130 million to its public health pharmacy and supplies division, though this is mainly for purchase purposes.

For development expenditure (DE), the government will allocate RM800 million to upgrading and expanding hospital facilities in 2019, amounting to a RM132 million increase in funding. The allocation for building new hospitals has doubled, by an increase of RM140 million. Whether this is sufficient to meet the demand is uncertain, looking at the current situation where many government hospitals are overcrowded and facilities and equipment are desperately in need of repair and maintenance. In any case, the additional DE funding is crucial and pertinent. At least the government has tried its best to increase the allocations despite current budget constraints. 

Budget documents are useful indicators for understanding the government’s departmental operations, policy direction and priorities, as well as political determination for the upcoming year. Whether or not the MOH will manage its financial allocations well and achieve its policy targets by the tabling of Budget 2020 remains to be seen. As the idiom goes, put your money where your mouth is.

The article was published here at The Malaysian Insight, Voices, Nov 13, 2018.

'Samurai' Loans and Mahathir

R:

Any thoughts on the Japan ‘samurai’ loans? PM is back in Japan for the third time. Possible he’s raising more loans from Tokyo?

CH:

It is perhaps the only possible avenue for PM Mahathir to raise loans in favourable terms. Since he took over the premiership, his stances on various mega-project deals with China possibly had angered the leadership in Beijing. After his visit to China, things are still uncertain and nothing is brought back to the country. 

PM is long known to have close ties with Japan since his first stint as PM. In the past, he brandished himself as the third world leader or hero did not augur well with western power especially the US. More so, occasionally his remarks were close to anti-semitic, this does not sit well with many powerful financial institutions in the US. 

The overblown-mentioned and often-exaggerated national debt and liabiliaty/ contigency issue , also does not help Malaysia secure loan deals in favourable terms. Therefore, it is best for him to stick with his best ally and perhaps few friendly (and rich) partner.

R:

Ahh. That’s interesting

How good are the deals btw?

Interest is definitely low at 0.65%, but what else is there?

CH:

RM7.4 billion at 0.65% is definitely a kill....given the scale of loan.

A prudent government should always know how to handle their national debt by refinancing with better loan deals.

But this favourable loan deal must be seen in the context of Japan-Malaysia diplomatic relationship, perhaps there will be more bilateral agreements to go along with, which would be in the interest of Japan too.

R:

Is a yen loan considered to be safe? I’ve heard how a ‘strong yen’ and a ‘weak yen’ can greatly affect the Japanese economy

CH:

i dont know what is the loan release mechanism over 10 year period, yes the currency fluctuation might be a risk, still it could be a risk worth taking given such floor interest rate.

R:

Ah okay, thank you Chee Han

He's also getting a medal, second highest honour

Is that a sign that they really admire him?

CH:

This is a symbol of appreciation to Dr M for forging a cordial relationship between Japan and Malaysia. Indeed Dr M has done a lot (that must have also drawn irks from China)

R:

Hahaha true

Looking at the past recipients of the award, it seems well curated

The Japanese don't simply throw medals to just about anybody

CH:

in half year 3 visits to Japan as a PM, that record deserves a medal already lah 😂

Minimum Wage and its implications to Singapore

Last week, I had accepted a written interview with a journalist from a Singapore press, questioning me on issues related to Minimum Wage, and what would be the implications to Singapore.

Below are my full responses given, but understandably, she only quoted me on two occasions because she had also other interviewees to give inputs.

***

1. I understand there are plenty of reasons for and against minimum wage. But at the core of it is about social inequality - can minimum wage narrow the income gap? What is a minimum wage policy supposed to achieve actually?

CH:

According to International Labour Organization (ILO), minimum wage is defined as “the minimum amount of remuneration that an employer is required to pay wage earners for the work performed during a given period, which cannot be reduced by collective agreement or an individual contract.”

The core function of minimum wage is acting as a form of workers protection mechanism against unduly low pay. The amount of pay signifies a minimum expectation of a fair and just compensation to the fruits of labour regardless of which sector one works in, and who are employed (domestic and foreign, too, should be equally applied). Some coin it as minimum living wage to hedge against poverty, to allow a worker to live with dignity with at least that amount of remuneration to survive.

If the ‘social inequality’ you referred to (in the first part of your question sentence) means income inequality, implementing or raising the minimum wage could have cascading effects on the lowly paid jobs at the most bottom of labour market (ie. jobs which are paid slightly above the minimum wage would usually be pressured to adjust accordingly), and it should effectively help increase the income of low income workers, periodically.

Whether or not the so-called income gap could be narrowed, actually that depends more on the growth rate of top and middle income tiers. Periodic adjustment of minimum wage is usually at most a couple of hundreds if not at least tens of dollars, compared to middle and top income earners their salary increment could be in the range of few hundreds to tens of thousands during the same period. If that is the case, in real term, the income gap could be also widen even if minimum wage is implemented.

2. Can minimum wage be effective without supporting policies like capping top wages? What about protecting price inflation as a result of minimum wage?

CH:

The purpose of implementing minimum wage is not to reduce income equality via restricting or capping on top wages, but uplifting the low income households.

In the reference formula for setting a minimum wage rate in Malaysia, it clearly considers a few key macro- and microeconomic factors such as labour productivity , consumer price index (inflation rate), poverty line income , average number of workers per household, and median wage (for bottom income tier).

One should also consider what is called ‘social wage’ where certain basic public services (as social safety net) are provided to citizens so that the low income earners do not have to fork out their precious little wage to pay for such services. Effectively, living in such society with good public and social support in many ways could help increasing disposable income and relieving the household financial burden, particularly meaningful to the low income households.

3. Proponents of minimum wage believe that wage would drive demand and spending, spurring the economy. How true is that across economies? Meanwhile, the other side believes profit drives demand, and spurring demand for businesses would drive employment and wages rather than having a minimum wage.

CH:

With the implementation of minimum wage, low income earners would expect better and more stable income prospect in supporting their ever-increasing living cost.

The establishment or increment of minimum wage would contribute additional financial resource to low income earners, but most likely they will spend or cross-subsidize most of it on rather essential items purchase.

For example, according to Household expenditure survey 2016 in Malaysia, household income class lower than RM2,000 per month had already spent more than half of their income on food , housing utilities and transport.

So, additional amount of wage could be translated to additional household expenditure, and this could help spurring or favouring certain sector or industry rather than across the board. Small businesses such as hawker food stalls and petty traders are more likely to capture the extra amount of household expenditure. Thus, as a result of minimum wage policy (if the amount is appropriately set), it could have positive effect in encouraging  businesses and employment, rather than forcing businesses to shut down.

4. I know policy makers are most afraid that minimum wage will result in reduced employment or illegal work

CH:

For the case of Malaysia, the total number of employment is actually increasing after Malaysia first implemented the Minimum Wage in 2013.

This policy may be partially responsible for the improvement in labour force participating rate (LFPR) from 65.6% in 2012 (pre-minimum wage policy) to 67.7% in 2016. The implementation of the minimum wage policy also coincided with an increase in women’s participation in the labour force, where female LFPR reached 54.3% in 2016, up from 49.5% in 2012. The number of employed persons in Malaysia also increased from 12.8million in 2012 to 14.2million in 2016. This clearly shows that employment opportunities and labour participation in Malaysia were not negatively affected by the minimum wage policy.

For the case of Singapore, if the minimum wage policy were implemented, most likely it will only positively affect the low income earners, together with foreign migrant workers (who hold work permit - 965,200 and S-pass - 184,400, as of Dec 2017). Given that Singapore has a large foreign workforce and many are in the low income categories, the minimum wage should be set at appropriate rates in the most transparent manner. If the employers feel ‘too expensive’ to continue hiring foreign workers (such as in the construction and domestic works) perhaps they really pay too low to workers, or they should consider hiring local Singaporeans who still want to work if the minimum wage is decent enough for living. In this way, perhaps Singapore could be more self-reliant in local labour market, or pay a right price for foreign labour.

I do not think that the Singapore authority could tolerate illegal work, and most probably local Singaporeans would not accept a lower paid job than the minimum wage. For foreign workers, I doubt that they can do illegal work easily in a city state which is rather tight in immigration control.

5. ...and make the country uncompetitive for MNCs to take root?

CH:

I believe most of the MNCs Singapore attracted are not in labour intensive low-skilled industry, thus most likely their staffs/workers are not near the minimum wage. Labour policy could be a consideration for MNC to invest and grow in Singapore, but probably more towards the existent supply of middle to high skilled workers, such as those in the finance, education, health and IT sector.

The minimum wage could have uplifted many low income local Singaporeans who do not have much bargaining power to their employers, and yet face wage depression due to differential payment to foreign and local workers. They need some kind of workers protection in term of wage arrangement in order to live with means in an increasingly more expensive city.


6. At the core of it, is the basis for minimum wage a moral argument?

CH:

I do not think it is JUST a moral argument, but a fundamental labour right. If the labour do not have strong and independent unions, the compensation for their fruits of labour (in terms of wage) would just leave it to the market to determine, however due to very unequal power heavily-tilted to the employer side, the workers would most likely get unfair deal and undercut. This would actually reduce the welfare of workers in the city. Making their life harder is not going to make them happier, there would be a social cost and negative externalities to that policy.

I think the government should take pro-active approach to protect the welfare of workers, show the care by standing on the workers’ side to prevent them from being abused by the market.

7. Just want to check if there is any data on impact of minimum wage on Malaysian SMEs?

CH:

Malaysia has introduced minimum wage on 1st January 2013 (RM900 for Peninsular Malaysia; RM800 for East Malaysia) and revised on July 2016 (RM1,000 for Peninsular Malaysia; RM920 for East Malaysia). 

The annual growth of SME GDP actually shot up in 2014 and 2017(p) after the introduction and revision of the minimum wage rates. In terms of SMEs contribution to GDP, the percentage share of SMEs is growing year-on-year, even after the intervention of minimum wage policy. Biggest jump was in 2014, a year after the introduction of minimum wage.

 

Source: Department of Statistics, Malaysia

According to Economic Census, there was a 42% increase in number of SME establishments in 2015 compared to 2010, after the introduction of minimum wage policy. Numbers of value of gross output, value added, total persons employed/engaged were also increased, compared to 2010.

Source: Economic Census 2011 & 2016, Department of Statistics Malaysia

This shows that the minimum wage policy did not negatively affect the growth of SME industries (as a whole) in Malaysia, the economic growth for SMEs continues and maybe for better. Besides, the policy might have produced more social values that cannot be captured by the economic values stated in the statistics.

健康關懷計劃的隱憂

注：這文章隨著財政預算案和最新計劃內容的發佈，現在已‘過時’了。當初是為了配合英文文告一起推出，怎知來不及。就放在此當作記錄。

健康關懷計劃的隱憂

前天，希盟新政府財長林冠英在國會提呈了首份財政預算案。衛生部的預算也包括在其中，最受矚目的是新政府欲落實的大選承諾——‘健康關懷’計劃（Skim Peduli Sihat, SPS）。這是一項針對家庭收入最底層40巴仙 人民（B40）而策劃推行的醫療福利計劃，主要是為了減輕低收入病患者的醫療費用負擔并提供另類選擇，同時舒緩那些擁擠爆滿的政府醫院。預料這計劃將會獲得相當可觀的撥款資助，但由於本文作者在截稿之前無法窺探而知準確數目，以及其執行落實方式，所以本文在此僅梳理該SPS計劃可能帶來的隱憂，同時論述它如何進而影響整體的公共醫療體系。

對於一個估計耗資大約14億馬幣的大型福利計劃‘重頭戲’，可惜公眾不太清楚甚至不知道有如此的計劃，甭說政府咨詢他們的意見。在公開場合，衛生部部長和副部長對該計劃的描述不多，僅說明如今政府的新計劃會比雪州政府的原版計劃更佳，而計劃細節將在預算案當天公佈。據了解，B40成員將可獲得免費醫療，包括在私人醫院接受治療。此外，政府還雄心勃勃為B40添加預防性治療、保健宣傳以及與非感染疾病有關的健康檢查服務。政府也不時暗示著這計劃將會是挺進國家保健計劃的第一步，就先從B40低收入群開始著手。

公共醫療發展撥款或受影響

在有限的訊息情況下，我和夥伴針對該計劃完成和發佈了一項研究，欲告知公眾這計劃存在著非永續性的高風險，即使就僅提供給B40群私人醫院入院服務而已。首先，我們根據2015年《國家衛生和病情調查》報告裡的尋醫選擇行為和頻率，計算和預測了B40對私人醫院的住院和門診治療需求。然後我們再對照原版雪州SPS模式的粗略預算，即每B40家戶可獲每年五百令吉的資助。如此一來，該計劃的最高預算可達14億令吉，或相等於2018衛生部預算撥款的5.3巴仙。

我擔憂的是如果兩天前公佈的明年財政預算僅僅是數目調整而沒有遵循競選宣言里承諾顯著提升撥款，那麼該SPS計劃的撥款不是要與其他現成的營運和發展項目競爭嗎？

我也擔心，推行如此的計劃將加劇其他方面的撥款削減，特別是衛生部的發展撥款。我國的公共醫療設施要持續提升擴張和發展，這也是政府一再向人民保證的承諾，其重要性不在話下。可是，SPS計劃的撥款若非全部就是絕大部分都會注入私人醫療界，政府又如何自圓其說解釋其矛盾呢？

津貼不足付給手術費

根據統計，2015年B40人口的入院治療普及率是7.8巴仙。我國的平均家戶人口是4.1人，這將意味著每年大約有28.3%或相等於80萬6千的B40家戶將求醫入院治療。同時根據2015年的報告，B40印象中在私人醫院里的重大手術費平均都已超過1萬令吉。這也表示，若SPS計劃提供的家庭補助津貼頂限為1萬令吉，將會有一半以上的B40病人將不足以償還手術治療費。如果說一萬令吉都已不足夠補助一個家庭成員，那麼我國平均家戶人口是4人，一個人耗盡了全家的全年補助後，其他的成員將何去何從？

再說，目前的B40的私人醫院入院率為10巴仙（九成仍依賴公共醫療），家庭收入最高20巴仙階層（T20）人民則為40巴仙。如果就僅依據目前B40的私人醫療使用率，這已達最高SPS預算的56.6巴仙了。但是若有了這SPS計劃提供的津貼，有兩倍到4倍以上的B40成員改變了求醫習慣和選擇呢，會有什麼情景？我們的研究發現，這趨向將會讓該計劃的預算透支破產。尚且這只是入院治療的情景推算，還沒包括門診和健康檢查費用。

政府應控制成本

若津貼索償機制純粹建立在‘有償服務’(fee-for-service)的基礎上，而政府又沒有任何控制成本的措施，我們擔心私人界將有心利用這個制度漏洞，誘發更多B40成員的需求推薦很多不需要的掃描診斷和治療以期獲得最高利潤。這將損及政府的利益。

另一個可能的負面結果是，B40群將會更依賴私人醫療界，從而加劇政府與私人醫院的資源鴻溝，變相鼓勵更多有經驗的專科醫生和護理助手從公共領域轉入私人醫療。無形中，這將造成公共醫療在財務上和各類資源上更落後匱乏，變成某些人民的低劣素質和不得已的選擇，這是政府樂見的嗎？目前的公共醫療仍算是普及，絕對是對人民較廉宜的選擇。

這裡我想給衛生部的建議是，首先必須要賦權初級保健公共領域醫生為‘看門人’，意即SPS受惠人必須先得到醫生的轉診推薦才能前往指定（和已協商過）的私人醫院治療使用津貼。

其二，津貼索償機制不應建立於‘有償服務’，而是相關疾病組費用（Disease Related Group）。這代表醫生或醫院只能根據診斷獲得一筆固定費用治療某病人，而不是根據治療程序和材料。這可間接避免濫用系統和誘發需求。

其三，衛生部應同時向B40成員收取有如目前衛生部的共付額（co-payment），如果後者在私人醫院使用SPS津貼。我們深信這樣才對公共醫院使用者公平。

應優先發展公共醫療

總的來說，我同意衛生部應有伸縮性選擇與私人醫療界共享資源，尤其是當有需要的時候，付費給後者使用他們未充分使用的先進儀器配備和服務。雖然我很高興衛生部致力於提供醫療服務給有需要的B40低收入階層，我還是對SPS計劃的財務永續性和長遠的影響抱有顧慮和保留。特別是當牽涉到如此龐大的財政預算，以及顯著的改變醫療財務系統（往社會保健制度），衛生部應該要更透明和開放給利益相關者和公眾洽詢和質問，不應該先提呈至國會就宣佈了。

我認為衛生部應認清優先處理事項其實是改善和捍衛我們的公共醫療。因此，一個更充分獲得撥款發展的公共醫療系統總比目前的SPS計劃來得更有利益和好處。